



Gelen Evrak Kayıt: 25.02.2026 - 1012

TÜRKİYE ODALAR VE BORSALAR BİRLİĞİ



Dumlupınar Bulvarı No:252 (Eskişehir Yolu 9. Km.) 06530 /ANKARA

www.tobb.org.tr - tobb@hs01.kep.tr

Sayı : E-34221550-741.01.01-2726

Tarih: 24.02.2026

Konu : Avrupa Komisyonu 2026 Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Raporu ve Eşlik Eden Belgeler

Tüm Oda ve Borsalar (Genel Sekreterlik)

İlgi : Ticaret Bakanlığı'nın 23.02.2026 tarihli ve 00119048102 sayılı yazısı.

Ekte bir örneği sunulan ilgi yazıda, Avrupa Komisyonu İç Pazar, Sanayi, Girişimcilik ve KOBİ'ler Genel Müdürlüğü (DG GROW) tarafından 30 Ocak 2026 tarihinde "2026 Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Yıllık Raporu" nun yayımlandığı belirtilmiştir.

Yazıda, raporun İşleyen Bir Tek Pazar, İnovasyon Açığının Kapatılması, Sanayinin Karbonsuzlaşması ve Yatırım, Güvenliğin Artırılması ve Bağımlılıkların Azaltılması şeklinde dört (4) ana başlıktan oluştuğu ifade edilerek, başlıkların içeriğine dair bilgi verilmiştir.

Yazıda devamla, raporun bir dizi tamamlayıcı belge ile desteklendiği belirtilmiş ve bu belgelere erişim sağlanabilecek bağlantı adresi paylaşılmıştır.

Bilgilerinizi ve ilgili üyelerinize duyurulmasını rica ederim.

Saygılarımla,

e-imza

Mustafa SARAÇÖZ
Genel Sekreter

EK:

- 1- Ticaret Bakanlığı Avrupa Komisyonu 2026 Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Raporu ve Eşlik Eden Belgeler (3 Sayfa)
- 2- Ek-1 2026 Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Raporu (16 Sayfa)
- 3- Ek-2 Komisyon Hizmetleri Çalışma Belgesi (65 Sayfa)
- 4- Ek-3 2024–2025 Dönemi Tek Pazar Uygulama Görev Gücü Yıllık Raporu (19 Sayfa)



Evrakı Doğrulamak İçin : <https://belgedogrula.tobb.org.tr/belgedogrulama.aspx?eD=BSC619K8NL>
Tel : +90 (312) 218 20 00 (PBX) - Faks : +90 (312) 219 40 90 -91 -92... - E-Posta : info@tobb.org.tr
Bilgi İçin: Batuhan GÜNEŞ - Tel : 03122182225 - E-Posta : batuhan.gunes@tobb.org.tr



T.C.

TİCARET BAKANLIĞI

Uluslararası Anlaşmalar ve Avrupa Birliği Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : E-79668890-749-00119048102
Konu : Avrupa Komisyonu 2026 Tek Pazar ve
Rekabetçilik Raporu ve Eşlik Eden
Belgeler

DAĞITIM YERLERİNE

Avrupa Komisyonu İç Pazar, Sanayi, Girişimcilik ve KOBİ'ler Genel Müdürlüğü (DG GROW) tarafından 30 Ocak 2026 tarihinde "2026 Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Yıllık Raporu" yayımlanmıştır. Raporda, Avrupa Birliği (AB) ekonomisinin rekabet gücünün jeopolitik belirsizlikler, küresel ticaret baskıları ve stratejik bağımlılıklar bağlamında önemli sınamalarla karşı karşıya olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca, Tek Pazarın Avrupa ekonomisinin temel dayanağı olduğu belirtilmekte ve iç engellerin kaldırılmasının büyüme, dayanıklılık ve sanayi kapasitesi açısından kritik önem taşıdığı ifade edilmektedir.

Söz konusu Raporda Tek Pazarın işleyişi, inovasyon açığının kapatılması, sanayinin karbonsuzlaştırılması ve stratejik bağımlılıkların azaltılması olmak üzere dört ana bölüm çerçevesinde kapsamlı değerlendirmeler yapılmaktadır. 29 temel performans göstergesine (KPI) dayalı analizde bazı alanlarda ilerleme sağlandığı, ancak özellikle araştırma-geliştirme (AR-GE) yatırımları, özel sektör yatırımları ve hizmet piyasalarındaki düzenleyici alandaki dağınık yapı gibi konularda ilerlemenin sınırlı kaldığı belirtilmektedir. AB iş gücü verimliliğinin ABD seviyelerinin altında seyrettiği, Ar-Ge harcamalarının 2030 hedefinin gerisinde kaldığı ve dijital teknolojilerin işletmeler tarafından benimsenme oranının artırılmasının gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır. Raporda Tek Pazardaki en önemli engel (*terrible ten*) hem Avrupa hem ulusal düzeyde kaldırılması için ortak eylem ihtiyacı olduğu belirtilmekte olup; bu amaçla idari yüklerin azaltılmasına yönelik olarak ilk yıllık Tek Pazar Uygulama Gündemi tanıtılmaktadır.

"İşleyen Bir Tek Pazar" başlıklı ilk bölüm, ulusal ve Avrupa düzeyinde devam eden engellerin Tek Pazarın ekonomik potansiyelinin tam olarak kullanılmasını engellediği ifade edilmektedir. Tek Pazarın AB GSYH'sine yıllık yüzde 3-4 katkı sağladığı ve milyonlarca istihdam yarattığı belirtilmekle birlikte, mal ticaretinde entegrasyonun durağanlaştığı ve hizmet ticaretindeki artışın sınırlı kaldığı tespit edilmektedir. Bu durumun, özellikle ulusal düzenlemelerdeki ayrışma, standart belirleme süreçlerindeki yavaşlık ve ürün uygunluk denetimlerindeki yetersizliklerden kaynaklandığı değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca, kamu alımları alanındaki mevcut çerçevenin çok sayıda sektörel tasarruf içermesi nedeniyle parçalı bir görünüm arz ettiği, bunun da hem kamu otoriteleri hem de ihalelere katılan şirketler açısından belirsizlik ve uygulama farklılıkları yarattığı belirtilmektedir.

"İnovasyon Açığının Kapatılması" başlıklı ikinci bölüm, AB'nin güçlü üniversiteleri ve nitelikli iş gücüne rağmen yenilikçilik yarışında küresel rakiplerinin gerisinde kalma riskiyle karşı karşıya bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. AR-GE harcamalarının GSYH içindeki payının uzun süredir hedeflenen seviyenin altında seyrettiği ve özel sektör yatırımlarının yetersiz kaldığı ifade edilmektedir. Dijital teknolojilerin benimsenme hızının düşük olması, özellikle KOBİ'ler açısından verimlilik artışını ve ölçeklenmeyi sınırlayan temel faktörlerden biri olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu eğilimlerin sürmesi halinde AB'nin teknolojik bağımsızlığının ve küresel rekabet gücünün zayıflayabileceği vurgulanmaktadır.

Bu belge güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Belge Doğrulama Kodu: 5C7E66C0-922A-4BF2-A6EF-588C9E8CC227

<https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/ticaret-bakanligi-ebys>

Adres: T.C. Ticaret Bakanlığı Söğütözü Yerleşkesi (Merkez Bina) Söğütözü

Mah. 2176. Sk. No:63 06530 Çankaya Ankara

Telefon No: 03122049067 Faks No: 03122128741

e-Posta: e.selek@ticaret.gov.tr

İnternet Adresi: www.ticaret.gov.tr

KEP Adresi:

Ayrıntılı bilgi için:

Esma SELEK

Ticaret Uzman Yardımcısı

Telefon No: 03122049067



“Sanayinin Karbonsuzlaşması ve Yatırım” başlıklı üçüncü bölümde, yüksek enerji fiyatları ve zayıf özel yatırım iştahının AB sanayisinin rekabetçiliğini olumsuz etkilediği belirtilmektedir. Elektrifikasyon oranının uzun süredir artış göstermediği, buna karşın yenilenebilir enerji kapasitesinin genişlemeye devam ettiği ifade edilmektedir. Kamu yatırımlarının ve AB düzeyindeki finansman araçlarının sanayi dönüşümünü desteklediği, ancak Tek Pazar içindeki düzenleyici alandaki dağınıklığın döngüsel ekonomi hedeflerine ulaşılmasını zorlaştırdığı tespit edilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, ikincil ham madde piyasalarının gelişiminin sınırlı kaldığı ve üçüncü ülkelere bağımlılığın devam ettiği vurgulanmaktadır.

“Güvenliğin Artırılması ve Bağımlılıkların Azaltılması” başlıklı dördüncü bölümde ise, küresel ticaret yapısındaki köklü değişimlerin AB’nin tedarik zincirlerindeki stratejik kırılganlıkları daha görünür hale getirdiği belirtilmektedir. AB’nin küresel ticaretteki payını genel olarak koruduğu, ancak özellikle imalat sanayisinin üçüncü ülkelerdeki aşırı kapasiteler, devlet destekleri ve ilave gümrük vergisi uygulamaları nedeniyle artan bir baskı altında bulunduğu ifade edilmektedir. Küresel ticaret bağlamında AB’nin güçlü konumunu koruduğu, ancak stratejik tedarik zincirlerinde dış bağımlılıkların yüksek seviyede kaldığı belirtilmektedir.

Özellikle **kritik hammaddeler ve temiz teknoloji bileşenlerinde dışa bağımlılık risklerine** dikkat çekilmekte ve sanayi kapasitesinin güçlendirilmesine yönelik **yeni politika araçlarının geliştirildiği** ifade edilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, **Sanayiye Hızlandırma Yasası’nın (Industrial Accelerator Act)** Avrupa’da imalat sanayii için lider pazarlar oluşturarak dayanıklılığı artırmayı, kalite odaklı istihdamı korumayı ve stratejik sektörlerde yerli üretim kapasitesini güçlendirmeyi amaçladığına da Raporda yer verilmektedir.

Raporun genel değerlendirmesinde Tek Pazarın Avrupa ekonomisi için bir “şok emici” işlevi gördüğü ve kalan yapısal engellerin kaldırılmasının Avrupa’nın uzun vadeli refahı ve **stratejik özerkliği açısından zorunlu** olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Raporda ayrıca, kamu alımlarının birçok küresel aktör tarafından tedarik zinciri dayanıklılığını artırmak amacıyla kullanılan temel politika araçlarından biri hâline geldiği ifade edilmekte; AB açısından da **kamu alımlarının** sadeleştirilmesi ve stratejik hedeflerle uyumlu hâle getirilmesinin, üçüncü ülkelere bağımlılıkların azaltılmasında önemli bir kaldıraç olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.

Konuya ilişkin olarak Refah ve Sanayi Stratejisinden Sorumlu İcraçı Başkan Yardımcısı Stéphane Séjourné, Raporda tespit edilen zorlukların ele alınması ve Tek Pazarın tam potansiyelinin açığa çıkarılması amacıyla halihazırda bir dizi adım atıldığını; geline aşamada AB ve üye ülkelerin, engellerin kaldırılması ve Tek Pazar Stratejisinin uygulanması yönünde kararlı bir şekilde hareket etmesi gerektiğini vurgulamıştır.

Söz konusu Rapor bir dizi tamamlayıcı belge ile desteklenmekte olup, bu kapsamda, “Komisyon Hizmetleri Çalışma Belgesi” (KPI’lar; Uygulama tabloları; seçili küresel aktörler tarafından alınan dayanıklılık önlemlerine genel bakış), “2026 etkileşimli çevrim içi Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Skor Tablosu” ve “2024–2025 Dönemi Tek Pazar Uygulama Görev Gücü Yıllık Raporu” ile konuya ilişkin Komisyon açıklamasına aşağıdaki bağlantıdan erişilebilmektedir:

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_252

Bu belge güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Belge Doğrulama Kodu: 5C7E66C0-922A-4BF2-A6EF-588C9E8CC227

Adres: T.C. Ticaret Bakanlığı Söğütözü Yerleşkesi (Merkez Bina) Söğütözü

Mah. 2176. Sk. No:63 06530 Çankaya Ankara

Telefon No: 03122049067 Faks No: 03122128741

e-Posta: e.selek@ticaret.gov.tr

İnternet Adresi: www.ticaret.gov.tr

KEP Adresi:

<https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/ticaret-bakanligi-ebys>

Ayrıntılı bilgi için:

Esma SELEK

Ticaret Uzman Yardımcısı

Telefon No: 03122049067



Öte yandan, bahse konu “Komisyon Hizmetleri Çalışma Belgesi”nde, AB'nin başlıca partnerlerinin stratejik bağımlılıklarını azaltmak ve yeşil ve dijital dönüşüm kapsamında tedarik zincirlerini daha dayanıklı hale getirmek için uyguladıkları sanayi, ticaret, finansman ve kamu alımları politikaları ile uluslararası iş birliklerine yönelik bir incelemeye de yer verildiği, bu kapsamda ülkemizin bulunmadığı dikkat çekmektedir.

Bilgilerini rica ederim.

Fatma Canan NİLÜFER DORA
Bakan a.
Genel Müdür Yardımcısı

Ek:

- 1- 2026 Tek Pazar ve Rekabetçilik Raporu
- 2- Komisyon Hizmetleri Çalışma Belgesi
- 3- 2024–2025 Dönemi Tek Pazar Uygulama Görev Gücü Yıllık Raporu

Dağıtım:

- Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği Genel Sekreterliğine (TOBB)
Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisine (TİM)
Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kuruluna (DEİK)
Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği Genel Sekreterliği (TÜSİAD)
Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği Genel Sekreterliğine (MÜSİAD)
Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonuna (TİSK)
Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneğine (YASED)
Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Üst Kuruluşuna (OSBÜK)
Türk Girişim ve İş Dünyası Konfederasyonu (TÜRKONFED)

Bu belge güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Belge Doğrulama Kodu: 5C7E66C0-922A-4BF2-A6EF-588C9E8CC227

<https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/ticaret-bakanligi-ebys>

Adres: T.C. Ticaret Bakanlığı Söğütözü Yerleşkesi (Merkez Bina) Söğütözü
Mah. 2176. Sk. No:63 06530 Çankaya Ankara
Telefon No: 03122049067 Faks No: 03122128741
e-Posta: e.selek@ticaret.gov.tr
İnternet Adresi: www.ticaret.gov.tr
KEP Adresi:

Ayrıntılı bilgi için:
Esmâ SELEK
Ticaret Uzman Yardımcısı
Telefon No: 03122049067





Brussels, 30.1.2026
COM(2026) 46 final

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS**

The 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report

{SWD(2026) 30 final}

Introduction

Europe's competitiveness faces unprecedented challenges in a volatile geopolitical situation. EU industry is coming under mounting pressure as third country overcapacities are directed towards the EU, important international currencies depreciate and rules-based international trade is challenged. The systemic and strategic application of increased tariffs, export controls and weaponisation of dependencies by major global actors highlight the need to strengthen the resilience of EU's supply chains.

The Single Market is our best asset to counter external pressure, and it is time to build on its strengths. It acts as a home market for our companies, as a springboard to scale and as a basis to advance the European interest. It provides a stable business environment, with strong institutions and a full commitment to the rule of law. However, significant barriers remain within the Single Market, notably at national level. As a result of the external pressure and internal barriers, Europe's industrial base is eroding, leading to a loss of manufacturing jobs and factory closures. There is an urgency to act effectively at both national and EU levels.

This Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report takes stock of the functioning of the Single Market and of EU competitiveness. The focus is on the main drivers for Europe's competitiveness along four pillars, with particular emphasis on the Single Market and tracking progress in the implementation of the Single Market Strategy. This Report assesses competitiveness bottlenecks and progress in addressing them making use of 29 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). This Report also includes the first annual Single Market Enforcement Agenda which sets out measures to forcefully address national barriers.

Since the start of this mandate, the Commission has put competitiveness at the core of its action. The Competitiveness Compass, presented in January 2025, was the first major initiative of this Commission mandate setting a path for Europe to regain competitiveness and secure sustainable prosperity. While this has sent a clear signal, these competitiveness enhancing measures need time to show tangible outcomes. This is also reflected in the Report's analysis and its KPIs which measure annual evolutions. Out of 29 KPIs, 6 show a clear improvement, 6 show a clear deterioration compared to last year, 15 remain broadly unchanged and for 2 there is not yet a second observation to assess the trend. Integration in the Single Market has reached a plateau (KPI 2) and most barrier-relevant KPIs show limited progress. At the same time, EU efforts to reduce administrative burdens on companies and administrations are starting to bear fruit (KPI 3). Expenditure in Research and Development remains below the 3% of GDP target (KPI 12) and is too low to close the innovation gap. Private investment has fallen (KPI 18), while Venture Capital investment remains below peers (KPI 20). The renewable build-out continues (KPI 24 and 25) and starts decreasing prices in some areas, although the overall level of energy prices remains high (KPI 22). The EU maintains a strong position in international trade amid fierce global competition (KPI 27), but strategic dependencies remain elevated (KPI 29).

Several supporting documents underpin this Report. Annex 1 provides an overview of the long-term trends of the KPIs underpinning the analysis. Annex 2 updates on progress with the implementation of policy actions under the Commission Competitiveness Compass, Clean Industrial Deal and Single Market Strategy. To put European competitiveness in the international context, Annex 3 gives an overview of resilience measures by selected global players. In

addition, the 2026 edition of the online Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard assesses the performance of different Single Market policy areas and monitors the countries' performance in implementing the four freedoms. The annual report of the Single Market Enforcement Taskforce (SMET) is also published in conjunction with this Report. SMET identified and developed strategies to tackle the 'Terrible Ten' barriers outlined in the Single Market Strategy, breaking them down into specific challenges and organising efforts to address them effectively.

SECTION 1 – A functioning Single Market

Persistent barriers at the national and European level hold back the Single Market, forgoing economic potential. Labour productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked in purchasing power adjusted terms, is one of the highest in the world, reflecting European competitiveness and prosperity. Still, there is a gap of around 20% compared with the US (KPI 1), mainly due to Europe lagging behind in the production and adoption of digital technologies¹. Recent trends risk widening this gap. The Single Market has raised EU GDP by 3-4% annually² and created more than 3.5 million jobs. Further integration has reached a plateau (KPI 2), with trade in goods inside the Single Market broadly stable over the recent years and falling in 2024 compared to 2023³, with trade in services still increasing but at a slow pace.

| KPI | What it measures | Latest EU values |
|---|---|--|
| KPI 1: Labour productivity | GDP per hour worked in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. | At 78.5% of US levels (2024) At 78.0% of US levels (2023) |
| KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market | Share of EU GDP represented by trade between EU Member States. | 22.0% for goods (2024) 23.5% for goods (2023) 7.9% for services (2024) 7.7% for services (2023) |
| KPI 3: Simplification of EU rules | Projected annual administrative savings from Commission's adopted omnibus simplification proposals and other initiatives. | EUR 15 bn (2025) |
| KPI 4: Conformity deficit | Share of transposed EU Single Market Directives for which infringement proceedings for incorrect transposition were launched. Target <= 0.5%. | 1.1% (2025) 0.9% (2024) |
| KPI 5: Ease of regulatory compliance | Replies to the survey question: '... how easy is it for companies to comply with government regulation and administrative requirements ⁴ ?' | 3.89 out of 7 (2025) 3.66 out of 7 (2024) |
| KPI 6: Recognition of professional qualifications | Positive recognition rates as % (EU average) of all received requests. | 82.2% (2023) 77.3% (2022) |
| KPI 7: Length of standard-setting procedures | Average length (in years) of the drafting stage of standards. | 4.0 (2024) 3.2 (2023) |
| KPI 8: Circular material use rate | Share of material recovered and fed back into the economy. Target = 24% in 2030. | 12.2% (2024) 12.1% (2023) |
| KPI 9: Product compliance monitoring | Median number of product investigations per million inhabitants in EU Member States ⁵ . | 102 (2024) 82 (2023) |
| KPI 10: Services trade restrictiveness | Restrictiveness of regulation in selected service sectors ⁶ . | 4.2% (2024) 4.2% (2023) |

¹ Draghi report: [The Draghi report on EU competitiveness](#).

² Lionel Fontagné, Yoto V. Yotov, Reassessing the Impact of the Single Market and Its Ability to Help Build Strategic Autonomy, Single Market Economics Papers, June 2024. Studies like J. in 't Veld, Quantifying the Economic Effects of the Single Market in a Structural Macromodel, February 2019, estimate much higher effects.

³ Fluctuations in the past years can to a large part be attributed to energy price fluctuations.

⁴ Index values from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater ease of doing business.

⁵ Measuring product investigations carried out by market surveillance authorities which are notified in ICSMS.

⁶ [OECD's STRI](#) showing the share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services being present in selected sectors.

| | | |
|--|--|--------------|
| KPI 11: Digitalisation of Single Market procedures | Share of Single Market relevant administrative procedures fully online for cross-border users. | 20.6% (2024) |
|--|--|--------------|

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Legend for KPI tables: | Improvement year-on-year | Stable | Worsening year-on-year | Single observation |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--------|------------------------|--------------------|

Removing the most harmful Single Market barriers is key to unlocking further growth across the EU. Although there is considerable variation between studies⁷ estimating the size of Single Market barriers, the evidence consistently shows that they remain highly detrimental to economic outcomes. Further removal of national barriers impeding cross-border trade in goods could result in welfare gains of approximately 1.3%⁸. The Single Market Strategy⁹ identified the Terrible Ten as the most pressing barriers¹⁰, requiring action at both EU and national level (see Box 1). Accordingly, of the 11 KPIs measuring Single Market-related aspects in this Report, eight pertain to the Terrible Ten barriers, while burdensome procedures for posting of workers and territorial supply constraints are not covered. This section therefore discusses progress on the Terrible Ten and then addresses digitalisation and SMEs in the Single Market.

BOX 1: THE ROAD TO REMOVE THE TERRIBLE TEN BARRIERS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The Single Market Strategy has identified the most harmful barriers affecting the Single Market, the so-called Terrible Ten. The Commission has conducted an analysis to break down the Terrible Ten into a more detailed list of priority problems and has started to discuss with Member States how these problems materialise at the national level. The aim of this exercise is to reach a mutually agreed state of play regarding how Member States perform on each of these issues. The overview will provide a basis for action to remove the identified barriers at the national level. The process of working on barriers has been endorsed by the Competitiveness Council and its concrete implementation will be launched in 2026.

Fragmented national rules continue to make it complex and costly to establish and operate companies across the EU, with no progress to date. The perception of ease of regulatory compliance has been broadly stable in the EU over past years (KPI 5), showing also that establishing a permanent presence in another Member States remains cumbersome, in particular as companies need to assess and comply with the national company law in each Member State.

Performance of EU market surveillance is still insufficient. This is illustrated by the fact that while the number of investigations is slowly increasing, national authorities notify that only 102 parcels are checked per one million inhabitants (KPI 9). In parallel, the exponential surge of e-commerce imports, reaching 4.6 bn small value consignments in 2024, puts pressure on customs and market surveillance authorities, posing a major challenge for checking compliance and safety, amplified by uneven national control performance and inefficient cooperation between authorities¹¹. This results in an uneven playing field for rules-abiding EU businesses. More generally, the EU product legislation framework regulating harmonised products, known as the

⁷ IMF ‘Scaling Up the Single Market to Boost Productivity’ (2024), or [Head and Mayer ‘No, the EU does not impose a 45% tariff on itself’ \(2025\)](#).

⁸ Roberto Bernasconi, Naim Cordemans, Vanessa Gunnella, Giacomo Pongetti, Lucia Quaglietti, [What is the untapped potential of the EU Single Market?](#), published as part of the ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 8/2025.

⁹ COM(2025) 500.

¹⁰ These are: complicated business establishment and operations, outdated harmonised product rules and lack of product compliance, territorial supply constraints, long delays in standard-setting that weigh on innovation and competitiveness, fragmented rules on packaging, labelling and waste, restrictive and diverging national services regulation, burdensome procedures for posting of workers, recognition of professional qualifications, lack of Single Market ownership by Member States, and overly complex EU rules.

¹¹ DG GROW-DG TAXUD report on Product Compliance, highlighting uneven level of controls at the border [Report on controls on products entering the EU market with regard to product compliance in 2024 - Publications Office of the EU](#).

New Legislative Framework (NLF)¹², is a major asset of the Single Market, but there is a lack of controls and a need for improvement in addressing market developments, digitalisation, and circularity.

The Single Market for goods is further impeded by territorial supply constraints. They are imposed by some manufacturers of branded consumer goods and hinder retailers and wholesalers from buying products in one Member State and reselling them in another, harming cross-border business to the detriment of consumers.

Over the past decade, the average time needed to establish a new industrial standard has increased. Currently at four years (KPI 7), this slowness is partly due to outdated working methods and the under-utilisation of digital technologies. As a result, standardisation fails to meet market and legislative needs, particularly for new technologies, weighing on the competitiveness of EU industry.

In the area of packaging, labelling and waste, the Single Market remains fragmented, contributing to slow progress towards circularity. National labelling requirements, including those linked to waste sorting, require companies to relabel products or adapt digital content, splitting up the Single Market. Fragmentation of the Single Market for waste runs counter to circularity, with the circular material reuse rate increasing very slowly to 12%, well below the target of 24% set for 2030 (KPI 8).

Regulation of services markets is still complex and inconsistent, with little progress in recent years. The regulation of services can be justified by legitimate general interest objectives, but in practice there is a high level of diversity of restrictions and some services are regulated only in one or a few Member States, which shows that there is significant potential to reduce regulatory burden. Despite efforts to remove restrictions, the level of restrictiveness in services has remained stable in recent years (KPI 10) and deserves a new political impetus.

The temporary posting of workers is an integral part of the freedom to provide services but is still too cumbersome for companies. EU law allows Member States to impose administrative obligations to declare posted workers, where justified and proportionate. This reflects the need to ensure a level playing field and protect the rights of workers, in particular in risk sectors such as construction and agriculture. However, declaration procedures are often complex, while not all situations of posted workers (e.g. skilled specialists) pose the same risks. Reinforced efforts by Member States are needed to implement the best practices identified in the Single Market Enforcement Taskforce, which mostly fall within Member States' regulatory discretion, to reduce administrative barriers in this area¹³. Commission services, together with the European Labour Authority (ELA), are working to develop a KPI for next year's edition of this Report related to the posting of workers.

Lengthy and cumbersome procedures for the recognition of skills and qualifications can prevent EU citizens from exercising their profession in other Member States. Overly stringent regulation and cumbersome recognition procedures create barriers to entry and reduce labour market mobility, thereby contributing to skills mismatches and labour shortages at both national and EU level. Despite an improvement in 2023, the rate of positive recognition decisions

¹² [New legislative framework - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs](#).

¹³ The annual report of the Single Market Enforcement Taskforce (SMET) provides a detailed update.

remained broadly unchanged over the past five years (KPI 6). Further, recognition procedures are still often paper based and could be significantly sped up by full digitalisation.

The Commission is stepping up efforts to address the conformity deficit, measuring the share of incorrectly transposed Single Market directives, which remains too high. It is crucial that Member States assume full ownership of the Single Market. The conformity deficit has increased to 1.1% in 2025, remaining much above the target of 0.5% (KPI 4), with wide variation among Member States. Regulatory fragmentation comes at an important cost to businesses and households. A strong compliance culture is needed across the Single Market and is key to ensuring that preventive instruments, in particular the Single Market Transparency Directive, the Services Directive and the Proportionality Test Directive, can deliver their full effect. There is no point in removing barriers if we constantly create new ones. To drive effective legal action where barriers persist, the Commission sets out for the first time an Annual Single Market Enforcement Agenda (see Box 2). While Single Market barriers largely stem from regulatory and administrative requirements set at national level, differences in their practical application and enforcement by national, regional and local authorities can affect how businesses benefit from market integration, contributing to uneven outcomes in the functioning of the Single Market.

BOX 2: THE ANNUAL SINGLE MARKET ENFORCEMENT AGENDA 2026

The Commission pursues appropriate legal action as the cornerstone of enforcement of the Single Market rules. Based on the Terrible Ten barriers, the first Annual Single Market Enforcement Agenda therefore identifies the following priority areas for horizontal investigations and specific enforcement actions:

- Late payments in transactions between undertakings and public authorities.
- Obstacles in construction and installation services related to the green transition.

These investigations and enforcement actions, where necessary, will cover potentially most or all Member States and will include open dialogue and, where necessary to remove clearly identified barriers, infringement proceedings. The enforcement priorities will not be set to the detriment of the treatment of other existing or future obstacles to the free movement of goods and services. To enhance transparency on enforcement, when specific enforcement actions are decided, clear explanations regarding the objectives pursued, the expected benefits as well as the results achieved will be published.

Significant progress has already been made to reduce administrative burdens. These burdens weigh on businesses and administrations and are estimated at EUR 150 bn per year across the EU, with the target to reduce these by at least 25%, and by at least 35% for SMEs, by the end of this mandate. The Commission has already proposed ten omnibus packages as well as other initiatives¹⁴ which, at the time of their adoption by the Commission, are projected to reduce the recurrent administrative annual burdens by around EUR 15 bn, of which EUR 11.9 bn from omnibus proposals and EUR 3.1 bn from other initiatives adopted in 2025 (KPI 3)¹⁵. Moreover, new initiatives, such as European Business Wallet Regulation has a potential to contribute

¹⁴ Other initiatives (14) are those resulting in administrative cost savings for businesses and public administrations at the time of their adoption by the Commission. They cover targeted revisions of existing EU acquis (e.g SFDR Review or Targeted revision of the EU rules for medical devices and in-vitro diagnostics).

¹⁵ These savings were estimated using the EU standard cost model.

significantly to the overall administrative cost reduction for businesses and public administrations, with minimum EUR 13.5 bn. The Commission is carefully assessing and bringing forward additional means to reduce administrative burdens. Public procurement is a case in point: the current framework is fragmented with numerous sectoral acts creating uncertainty and inconsistency in interpretation and application. Simplifying these rules would greatly help over 44 000 public authorities in the EU purchasing services, works and supplies, as well as companies bidding for these tenders, worth around 15% of GDP (\approx EUR 2.5 trillion).

The roll-out of digital tools and interoperable public services is still at an early stage and holds potential to reduce administrative time and compliance costs while strengthening legal certainty for businesses and citizens. The Single Digital Gateway (SDG) Regulation¹⁶ – expanded across an increasingly wide set of policy areas – establishes Your Europe as the EU’s main e-government entry point, giving citizens and business access to reliable, multilingual information on rights, obligations and administrative procedures in all Member States, as well as links to national portals and key online procedures. Yet, SDG implementation remains at an early stage and uneven across Member States and policy areas, with only 21% of key procedures fully online in 2024 (KPI 11). The EU business wallet, which was proposed at the end of 2025, will allow companies to securely identify and exchange data with governments and other businesses across the EU with full legal effect and trust.

The EU Single Market increases opportunities for SMEs to grow, despite persisting barriers. In 2024, a quarter of EU SMEs exported goods or services to other EU countries while about one in ten exported to countries outside the EU¹⁷. The main barriers for SMEs include regulatory obstacles and administrative burden, followed by challenges related to financing and skills. In addition, 73% of SMEs report suffering from late payments, which hampers their growth and investment potential and threatens their survival.

SECTION 2 – Closing the innovation gap

Europe risks losing its edge in the race for innovation. Despite boasting world-leading universities, growing employment rates and a highly qualified workforce, R&D expenditure and patenting rates in the EU remain flat. Start-ups and scale-ups struggle to grow, while digitalisation is progressing more slowly than in competing economies. Labour shortages and skills gaps in areas such as IT and clean tech hamper innovation.

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| KPI 12: R&D expenditure | Total private and public expenditure in research and development as a share of GDP. Target = Above 3% by 2030. | 2.24% (2024) 2.26% (2023) |
| KPI 13: Patent applications | Patent applications per million inhabitants ¹⁸ . | 152 (2024) 153 (2023) |
| KPI 14: Digital technologies adoption by companies | Share of European enterprises that have taken up cloud computing services, data analytics and/or Artificial Intelligence. Target = 75% by 2030. | Artificial intelligence: 20% (2025), 13.5% (2024) Data analytics: 39.9% (2025), 33.2% (2023) Cloud computing services: 46.7% (2025), 38.9% (2023) |
| KPI 15: Employment rate | The share of working-age people employed. Target = 78% by 2030. | 75.8% (2024) 75.3% (2023) |

¹⁶ [Regulation - 2018/1724 - EN - EUR-Lex.](#)

¹⁷ Flash Eurobarometer 559 – [Startups, scaleups and entrepreneurship.](#)

¹⁸ Patent applications submitted to the European Patent Office.

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| KPI 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition | Number of occupations requiring specific skills for the green transition where at least five Member States reported a shortage. | 25 (2024) 13 (2023) |
| KPI 17: PISA score | 15-year-olds' performance in the OECD's PISA tests. High scores indicate better performance. | Maths: 474 (2022), 492 (2018) Reading: 475 (2022), 488 (2018) Science: 484 (2022), 488 (2018) |

Notwithstanding the strong foundations of the EU research landscape, R&D investment in the EU still falls short of the 3% of GDP target. Total R&D investment in the EU reached 2.2 % of GDP in 2024, showing little progress over the ten years and remaining below peers (KPI 12). Despite high public R&D investment in the EU, private sector R&D investment trails peers, notably in overall corporate R&D¹⁹ and in digital technology. Innovation outcomes, such as Intellectual Property and patenting activity, which are crucial to commercial success and competitiveness, have also remained broadly flat in recent years (KPI 13). A closer look across the technology spectrum shows that the EU is a frontrunner in green inventions²⁰, and performs well in health, biotech and pharmaceuticals²¹, while it continues to score low in the area of digital²².

Even in areas where R&D investments are being made and results achieved, starting and scaling up innovative companies remain challenging. Innovative companies are hampered in their efforts to commercialise research and face regulatory fragmentation, heavy administrative burdens, and difficulties in access to finance, particularly venture capital. Even though Europe's tech sector grew by more than 15 000 new startups per year from 2018 to 2023, it produced only one fifth as many new unicorns as in the US²³. Moreover, the EU's market share in development of digital technologies remain modest, as a result, the EU continues to rely heavily on external providers of notably digital technologies. Fostering the transition from laboratory to market is crucial in this context, as through the Biotech Act²⁴.

The adoption of digital technologies is increasing, but too slowly²⁵. The share of companies in the EU using artificial intelligence, cloud computing and data analytics grew significantly in 2025, yet more slowly than in competing economies and far from being on track to meet the target of a 75% uptake by 2030 (KPI 14). The lagging uptake of digital technologies is most striking among SMEs²⁶. Similarly, there is market fragmentation in EU telecommunications further hampering deployment²⁷. As a result of these issues, substantial productivity gains remain unrealised. It is estimated that achieving the EU's digitalisation targets would unlock economic gains equivalent to 1.8% of GDP²⁸.

Employment rates are on the rise, but employment in manufacturing is shrinking. The EU employment rate reached a record high of 75.8% in 2024²⁹ (KPI 15) and is on track to meet the EU's headline target of 78% in 2030, but a significant gender gap remains. This performance is mostly in line with the US, but below trends in Japan and the UK³⁰. However, the weakening

¹⁹ [The 2025 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard](#).

²⁰ EU companies lead globally in patenting related to circularity, energy- intensive industries and clean transport, but less so in twin transition patenting.

²¹ [EIB Investment Report 2024/2025: Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe, European Investment Bank 2025](#), and [‘The 2025 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard’](#).

²² With exception of areas such as Quantum and Photonics.

²³ Start-up companies valued at EUR 1 bn. European Commission services calculations based on Dealroom.

²⁴ [Commission proposes new measures to improve health and the healthcare sector - European Commission](#).

²⁵ Eurostat.

²⁶ EU Digital Intensity Index composition overview 2015-2024.

²⁷ White Paper – How to master Europe's digital infrastructure needs? COM(2024) 81 final.

²⁸ State of the Digital Decade 2025: Keep building the EU's sovereignty and digital future. COM(2025) 290 final.

²⁹ Eurostat.

³⁰ OECD, Labour force participation rate.

competitiveness of the EU’s manufacturing industry led to an average monthly loss of about 27 000 manufacturing jobs over the past two years³¹.

Labour shortages and skills gaps remain a challenge, weighing on Europe’s ability to innovate and scale up. Nearly 80% of companies refer to them as the second biggest obstacle to investment and growth³². Many of the new jobs emerging from the green transition will be in sectors already experiencing increasing labour shortages³³ (KPI 16). Digital skills remain a challenge as well, with just 60 % of Europeans having basic digital skills³⁴ and the availability of ICT specialists with advanced skills remaining low³⁵. Europe is also facing difficulties in the area of basic skills³⁶ (KPI 17). Challenges relating to the recognition of qualifications across countries and language barriers hinder intra-EU labour mobility. Fostering skills development, including through vocational training, and attracting global talent are essential to addressing labour shortages.

SECTION 3 – Decarbonisation of industry and investment

Investment momentum in the EU is weak, reflecting both general uncertainty over the economic environment and a decline in competitiveness. Private investment and industrial production declined in 2024, although public investment is stable and provides an opportunity to unlock private sector activity through well-aligned policy design. High energy prices hinder industrial competitiveness. Electrification does not progress. The switch to clean energy is accelerating but not yet feeding through to lower electricity prices in the EU as a whole.

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| KPI 18: Private investment | Private investment (share of GDP). | 17.6% (2024) 18.6% (2023) |
| KPI 19: Public investment | Public investment (share of GDP). | 3.7% (2024) 3.6% (2023) |
| KPI 20: Venture capital investment | Venture capital investment (share of GDP). | 0.06% (2024) 0.06% (2023) |
| KPI 21: EU investments supporting industrial transition | Cumulative volume of InvestEU investments supporting industrial transition. | EUR 115.5 bn (Jun 2025) EUR 52.7 bn (Jun 2024) |
| KPI 22: Electricity prices for non-household consumers | Electricity prices for non-household consumers (EU ID price band, large commercial users) ³⁷ . | EUR 0.164 per kWh (2025) EUR 0.163 per kWh (2024) |
| KPI 23: Electrification | Electricity as a share of the total (final) energy consumption. Objective = 32% in 2030³⁸. | 22.9% (2023) 22.9% of (2022) |
| KPI 24: Share of energy from renewable sources | Renewable energy generation as share of energy consumption. Target = 42.5% in 2030. | 25.2% (2024) 24.5% (2023) |
| KPI 25: Annual growth in renewable electricity generation | Annually added capacity to generate renewable electricity. Objective = +100 GW per year³⁹. | +68 GW (2024) +67 GW (2023) |

EU private investment declined in 2024, among headwinds for industry. As a result, private investment as a share of GDP dropped to 17.6% of GDP in 2024 and stood on par with US levels,

³¹ European Commission based on Eurostat annual national accounts and Short-Term Statistics data and other sources.

³² EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS).

³³ Recent analysis identified 24 occupations relevant to the green transition with labour shortages across multiple Member States. Such occupations include plumbers and pipe fitters (20 Member States), insulation workers, civil engineers and air conditioning and refrigeration mechanics (14), civil engineering technicians (12) and roofers (11). They require technical and manual expertise essential to the green transition. See also EURES Reports on Labour Shortages and Surpluses (2024 and 2025 editions).

³⁴ Eurostat, based on EU survey on the use of ICT in households and by individuals.

³⁵ Eurostat.

³⁶ OECD PISA database.

³⁷ Electricity prices here exclude levies and taxes that companies can recover.

³⁸ This objective was set by the Commission in its “Clean industrial Deal” Communication.

³⁹ This objective was set by the Commission in its “Clean industrial Deal” Communication.

after being broadly stable and higher than in US in recent years (KPI 18)⁴⁰. Industrial production in the EU declined by 1.5% in 2023 and a further 2.4% in 2024. The financing of EU business investment is still too reliant on bank lending (accounting for more than 51% of business investment in 2024). Venture capital investment in the EU is only equivalent to 0.06% of GDP (KPI 20), one-tenth of US levels. Currently only 44% of EU households' financial savings are invested in company bonds, listed shares, investment funds and similar, which is much lower than in other jurisdictions⁴¹, despite a higher volume of savings in the EU⁴². Increasing the share of EU households' savings flowing towards productive investments in companies would strengthen capital markets and corporate financing structures⁴³. With this aim and to strengthen capital market integration, in 2025 the Commission adopted under the Savings and Investments Union strategy⁴⁴ policy initiatives that target among others securitisation, financial literacy, savings and investment accounts, supplementary pensions, market integration and supervision⁴⁵. Under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the National and Regional Partnership Plans will support reforms that advance, among others, the Savings and Investment Union and strengthen the development of market-based funding options.

Public investment remains on a firm footing and EU tools have successfully mobilised investment for the industrial transformation. In 2024 public investment in the EU reached 3.7% of GDP confirming the positive trend seen in recent years (KPI 19), also supported by the Multiannual Financial Framework, including cohesion policy⁴⁶ and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. As of June 2025, InvestEU, the EU's main tool for attracting public and private sector investment, had mobilised almost EUR 300 bn (of which 68.7% from the private sector)⁴⁷ in investments. More than one third of it, EUR 115.5 bn (KPI 21), supports the industrial transition. Under the Rearm Europe plan, EUR 800 bn is being unlocked for defence spending, with sizeable spillovers into investment and industrial production. From 2028 onwards, the European Competitiveness Fund will anchor EU-level public investment in Europe's industrial transformation, mobilise private capital at scale, and create a seamless pipeline from Horizon Europe-funded research to industrial deployment.

Aligning national public investment with EU industrial policy priorities is key to making the most of synergies and achieving impact. The new Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework, consistently with EU industrial policy priorities, simplifies the process to grant aid to accelerate investments in renewables, industrial decarbonisation, clean tech manufacturing and de-risk private investments. This will help align funding. As for Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs), there are already 11 approved IPCEIs⁴⁸ (of which four for hydrogen and two for batteries) and eight IPCEI candidates in the design phase⁴⁹. The new

⁴⁰ AMECO database.

⁴¹ See: "2025 – List of indicators to monitor progress towards the capital markets union objectives", EC, DG FISMA, 5 September 2025.

⁴² See: "European Financial Stability and integration Review", EC, DG FISMA 2025.

⁴³ <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2024/html/ecb.sp241122~fb84170883.en.html>

⁴⁴ [Savings and investments union - Finance - European Commission](#).

⁴⁵ Based on existing estimates in the literature and simplifying assumptions, the package on market integration and supervision alone could add EUR 1.3 to 3.6 trillion to GDP over the next 30 years. The benefits of having integrated capital markets in the EU are estimated to be significantly higher. See the impact assessment of the Market Infrastructure Package SWD(2025)643.

⁴⁶ Cohesion policy represents almost 13% of total government investment in the EU as a whole and 51% in less developed Member States, and encourages significant private investments. See [Ninth Cohesion Report on economic, social and territorial cohesion](#).

⁴⁷ [InvestEU - Performance - European Commission](#).

⁴⁸ See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/approved-ipceis_en. They enable a total investment of EUR 104.4 bn based on aid of EUR 37.6 bn.

⁴⁹ Advanced Semiconductor Technologies, Artificial Intelligence, Circular Advanced Materials for Clean Technologies, Compute Infrastructure Continuum, Innovative Nuclear Technologies, Biobased Chemicals, Biobased Materials, Biotechnologies for Food and Feed. See [Joint European Forum for IPCEI - Competition Policy - European Commission](#).

Competitiveness Coordination Tool⁵⁰ is being tested through two ongoing pilots on AI Gigafactories and on charging infrastructure for e-trucks. Under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the National and Regional Partnership Plans will be able to support IPCEIs and contribute to strengthening the Union's industrial base, in line with EU priorities and country-specific challenges.

Electricity prices remain too high in the EU. In the first semester of 2025, electricity prices for large industrial users were 0.16 EUR/KWh (KPI 22), which is lower than at the peak in 2023. However, electricity prices for business in the EU remain very high in international comparison, more than twice as high as in the US, as higher natural gas prices impact electricity wholesale markets. Energy intensive industries are particularly affected by high electricity and energy prices.

Electrification has stagnated over the last ten years. Electricity meets just 22.9% of the EU's total final energy consumption (KPI 23)⁵¹. High electricity taxes coupled with lengthy permitting and insufficient build-out of grids have a negative impact on electrification projects and the electrification of industrial processes and transport.

The ongoing switch to clean energy is accelerating and the EU is broadly on track to reach its climate targets. The roll-out of clean energy sources is expected to significantly reduce the costs of importing fossil fuels, improving the EU's resilience and industrial competitiveness in the medium term. Greenhouse gas emissions fell by 2.5% in 2024 compared with 2023, and now stand at 37.2% below 1990 levels, while the EU economy is 71% larger than it was in 1990. The EU is on track to meet its 2030 target of 55% emission reduction compared with 1990, if all Member States deliver on the measures agreed at EU level and those set out in their National Energy and Climate Plans. The shift to renewables is estimated to reduce fossil fuel imports by EUR 2.8 trillion between 2031 and 2050, compared with the 2011-2020 average⁵². Renewable energy generation has been growing remarkably: in 2024 it accounted for 25.2% of total energy consumption (KPI 24). The annual increase in the capacity to generate renewable electricity has been accelerating. In 2024 68 GW of renewable capacity was added, more than double the amount added in 2020 (KPI 25) but still below the annual objective⁵³.

Circularity is progressing slowly due to diverging rules in the Single Market. As mentioned in section 1, the share of recycled material injected back into the economy as a proportion of the overall use of materials increased very slowly, from 11.8% in 2023 to 12.2% in 2024 (KPI 8). This is well below the EU target of 24% in 2030 and not sufficient to reduce the demand of primary materials and related dependencies on third countries. For instance, today, although almost 38% of electrical and electronic waste is collected in the EU, less than 1% of rare earth elements are recycled⁵⁴. Diverging national rules or schemes on waste and recycled materials⁵⁵, combined with lower prices for virgin feedstock, hinder the development of markets for secondary materials. Furthermore, strategic raw materials like metal scrap or black mass remain unused. For some materials, such as aluminium and copper, high-grade wrought scrap is exported to foreign markets⁵⁶, which may undermine investment in domestic refining capacity.

⁵⁰ Competitiveness Compass for the EU, COM(2025)30 final.

⁵¹ Eurostat.

⁵² See COM(2025)484 final. Furthermore, energy efficiency can reduce fossil fuel import bills by around 25%.

⁵³ See also: [Assessment of progress towards the Energy Union and Climate Action objectives \(SWD\) - Energy](#).

⁵⁴ Eurostat ([Waste statistics - electrical and electronic equipment - Statistics Explained - Eurostat](#)).

⁵⁵ COM(2025) 500 final.

⁵⁶ COM(2025) 125 final.

SECTION 4 – Increasing security and reducing dependencies

Sweeping changes in the global trade landscape expose the vulnerabilities and strategic dependencies in Europe’s supply chains. The EU has a strong position in international trade, but is increasingly coming under pressure, in particular in manufacturing. This is fuelled by third country overcapacities, weak domestic demand in certain third countries and the depreciation of important international currencies. The strengthening of EU supply chains is progressing, but strategic dependencies remain stubbornly elevated and at increasing risk of being weaponised.

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| KPI 26: Trade with the rest of the world as a share of GDP | The EU’s degree of economic integration with the rest of the world. | 13.9 % for goods (2024) 14.7% for goods (2023) 8.1% for services (2024) 7.8% for services (2023) |
| KPI 27: Exports of goods and services as a share of worldwide imports | The EU economy’s market share. | 12.6% for goods (2024) 11.9% for goods (2023) 25.0% for services (2024) 25.4% for services (2023) |
| KPI 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity | Share of clean tech components tracked in the Net-Zero Industry Act that meet the domestic manufacturing benchmark. Target = 100%. | 6 out of 27 (22%) technology components exceed the benchmark rate (2024) |
| KPI 29: EXVI External Vulnerability Index | External vulnerabilities for strategically important industrial products ⁵⁷ . On a scale from 0 to 1, higher value: greater vulnerability. | 0.20 (2023) 0.19 (2022) |

A reconfiguration of global trade flows is underway. In 2021-2024, EU trade with countries outside EU free trade agreements dropped by 2.3 percentage points, compensated for by sourcing within the EU increasing by 1.3 percentage points and trade with EU free-trade-agreement partners, both near and far, increasing by 1 percentage point⁵⁸. Global trade flows show similar patterns with re-allocation according to geopolitical blocks⁵⁹.

After a long period of growing trade integration with the rest of the world there are now signals pointing to a slow-down or even a reversal of this trend. EU trade in goods with the rest of the world (average of imports and exports as a share of GDP) continues to decline for the second year in a row, corresponding to 13.9% of GDP⁶⁰ in 2024. While it can to some degree be attributed to energy price fluctuations, it also shows the trend of a deteriorating global trading climate. EU trade integration in services with the rest of the world has also slowed but remains on an increasing trajectory, reaching 8.1% of GDP in 2024⁶¹ (KPI 26).

The EU’s share of global trade remains stable, but pressure on manufacturing industry is building up. The most striking shift in trade dynamics over the past 25 years is that the previously EU-US centric landscape has shifted to a tri-polar one (see Figure 1 and 2). EU exports of goods account for 12.6% of global imports, slightly above the levels of 10 years ago, showing remarkable resilience. The EU’s trade balance in goods has swung back into surplus territory, after a drop related to energy price volatility. However, EU industry is coming under mounting pressure from global competition fuelled by overcapacities in certain third countries, in many cases supported by state subsidies⁶², as well as from third country tariffs. This is

⁵⁷ KPI 29 assesses the combined vulnerability to external shocks of the product categories within the scope of the Clean Industrial Deal. These broadly include semiconductors, net-zero technologies, raw materials, basic metals, chemicals, machinery and motor vehicles.

⁵⁸ R. Arjona, W. Connell, C. Herghelegiu (2024): “[Supply Chain Tectonics: Empirics on how the EU is plotting its path through global trade fragmentation](#)”, European Commission, Single Market Economics Papers.

⁵⁹ World Trade Organisation, World Trade Report 2023.

⁶⁰ Eurostat.

⁶¹ Eurostat.

⁶² For example in the area of [steel](#) and battery-electric vehicles.

that fuel unfair global competition⁶⁵. The EU is also accelerating the economic integration of enlargement countries prior to their accession, including through “Single Market Highways”⁶⁶.

Europe’s supply chains continue to show significant external dependencies, with increasing risk and evidence of these being weaponised. Among products in sensitive ecosystems where the EU is heavily dependent on a single supplier country, more than half of the EU’s dependencies originate from China⁶⁷. The EU’s overall dependence on imports of strategically important raw materials, components and industrial products remains largely unchanged, as measured by the EXVI indicator⁶⁸ (KPI 29), with the EU being significantly more exposed to external vulnerabilities than China, although less exposed than the US⁶⁹. Export restrictions imposed by China have put these dependencies in the spotlight, in particular for critical raw materials. Dependencies in the space and defence sector as well as for critical medicines deserve particular attention⁷⁰.

Europe’s main trading partners are increasingly pursuing measures to foster the resilience of their supply chains. Annex 3 to this Report provides an overview of resilience measures by selected global players. It shows a global trend to make more active use of industrial and trade policies to strengthen the resilience of supply chains. The actions include public procurement policies and FDI conditionalities, with focus on key strategic sectors and preferential domestic access.

The EU’s efforts to strengthen its manufacturing capacity in key industrial products are starting to bear fruit. The first sets of strategic projects under the Net-Zero Industry Act⁷¹ and the Critical Raw Materials Act⁷² have been selected. Looking at products within the scope of the Net-Zero Industry Act, EU manufacturing currently surpasses the benchmark of meeting 40% of EU consumption by domestic manufacturing in six of 27 technology areas. However, for the vast majority of monitored key components in battery technologies, electrolysers, hydrogen and solar, EU manufacturing capacity still significantly trails the benchmark⁷³ (KPI 28). Completing these measures and re-creating a level-playing field for our businesses is the aim of the Industrial Accelerator Act.

Conclusion and way forward

The Single Market is the shock absorber and resilience driver needed in uncertain times. It is the foundation of Europe’s prosperity, competitiveness, and industry. Removing remaining barriers within the Single Market could lift Europe’s GDP by several percentage.

Nevertheless, persistent challenges remain, and new ones arise amid geopolitical tensions, putting increasing pressure on Europe’s competitiveness. Barriers and fragmentation in the

⁶⁵ Commission Staff Working Paper: Priorities for Bilateral/Regional trade related activities in the field of Mutual Recognition Agreements for industrial products and related technical dialogue, Brussels, 25 August 2004, SEC(2004)1072.

⁶⁶ The Single Market Highways will integrate the business communities of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova into the EU Single Market by accelerating regulatory alignment, building industrial alliances and strengthening value chains.

⁶⁷ European Commission Chief Economist, based on Eurostat data and FIGARO tables (2023).

⁶⁸ William Connell García, Victor Ho, [EXternal Vulnerability Index \(EXVI\)](#), Single Market Economics Briefs.

⁶⁹ China finds itself in the least dependent position with a score in the EXternal Vulnerability Index of 0.12, with the EU at 0.20 and the US at 0.28 (see KPI 29).

⁷⁰ [Critical Medicines Act - Public Health - European Commission](#).

⁷¹ [Strategic projects under the Net-Zero Industry Act](#).

⁷² [Strategic projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act](#).

⁷³ European Commission, DG GROW. For more information about domestic manufacturing of key net-zero technologies, consult the section on [Global trade & economic security](#) in the Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard.

Single Market persist. Administrative burdens are too high. Energy prices remain persistently high and weigh on industry. Innovative entrepreneurs continue to lack access to finance at scale. Foreign overcapacities and third-country state subsidies are increasing and tilt the global playing field against Europe, while strategic dependencies are being weaponised.

Against this backdrop, it is urgent to mark a turning point and fully exploit the potential of the Single Market. If we want a strong, independent and prosperous Europe, we need to take a decisive commitment to complete the Single Market and implement the policy actions adopted by the Commission. Annex 2 provides a detailed overview tracking the implementation of the Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the Single Market Strategy. Bold action at national and European level is needed to complete the Single Market, close the innovation gap, foster investments and decarbonisation and strengthen the resilience of supply chains.

A new impetus is underway to remove barriers in the Single Market at both national and European level and to reduce administrative burdens. The Single Market Strategy has identified the ‘Terrible Ten’ as the most significant barriers for businesses, workers and citizens in the Single Market, to be addressed as a top priority. These barriers originate at both the European and national level and therefore require bold action at both levels. The Commission is working with Member States to unpack and address the most pressing barriers at the national level. The first annual Single Market Enforcement Agenda lines out the enforcement priorities for 2026. At the European level, the upcoming Product Act, Construction Services Act and Delivery Act will enhance the functioning of the Single Market. The Public Procurement Act will simplify and accelerate procedures, ensuring best use of the 15% of GDP spent via public procurement. The Commission has already brought forward simplification proposals, ten omnibus packages and additional initiatives expected to cut annual administrative burdens by EUR 15 bn; more will come in 2026. Under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the National and Regional Partnership Plans will include relevant reforms to further remove barriers, notably by improving the efficiency and digitalisation of public procedures.

This work on barriers, fragmentation and administrative burden needs to be accompanied by renewed ambition. We need to complete the Single Market in those sectors that were left aside by Jacques Delors 35 years ago and still operate along national lines. Key measures are needed to set uniform rules for a predictable environment with scale for citizens and businesses alike in telecoms, energy, services, capital, company law, research and innovation. Creating political ownership and commitment to this endeavour will be the purpose of the Single Market Roadmap.

The Commission is putting forward measures to close the innovation gap. The 28th regime (EU Inc.) will provide a single set of rules for companies to set up, operate and grow throughout the EU, creating fertile ground for start-ups, scale-ups and European unicorns. The European Innovation Act will expedite the market journey for innovations across sectors, while the multi-billion Scaleup Europe Fund will partner with private investors to aid company growth. The European Research Area Act will seek to remove barriers to knowledge sharing and promote the 5th freedom. The Digital Networks Act will reduce fragmentation in the Single Market. The Cybersecurity Act, the Quantum Act and the Cloud and AI Development Act will strengthen the sovereignty and security of European technologies and infrastructures. The implementation of the Union of Skills aims to build skills for quality jobs.

Targeted industrial policies are setting the stage for the re-industrialisation of Europe. The Industrial Accelerator Act will boost economic security and industrial capacities in key strategic sectors. The Battery Booster mobilises EUR 1.8 bn to strengthen battery manufacturing and the automotive industry in Europe. Besides these initiatives, the accelerated build-out of clean energy will pave the way for lower energy costs. Effective follow up on the Commission's recommendations and legislative proposals under the Savings and Investments Union will support EU businesses in accessing investment capital.

The Commission is actively addressing vulnerabilities and strengthening the resilience of supply chains. The RESourceEU Action Plan tackles Europe's overdependence on third country suppliers of critical raw materials. It also accelerates EU-relevant projects with the potential to reduce dependencies by up to 50% by 2029, mobilising up to EUR 3 bn in 2026 to this end. Furthermore, the Commission will work to facilitate a steady supply of critical raw materials to EU industries through rapidly deploying the instruments at its disposal (e.g. the Anti-Coercion Instrument) in cases when a third country restricts the supplies of critical raw materials to the EU, conditioning access to the Single Market. The EU is putting in place frameworks to ensure that FDI creates European value added. The Commission will propose targeted measures to ensure availability of aluminium scrap and, if necessary, additional measures to ensure availability of other metal scrap and black mass to strengthen strategic capacities. Efforts to advance on further free trade agreements will diversify supply chains and create new opportunities for businesses.

Mastering today's challenging environment requires prompt, joint and coordinated action at the European and national level. The 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report will act as a foundation for policy debates with the Council, the European Parliament, Member States and the business community.



Brussels, 30.1.2026
SWD(2026) 30 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

**Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
Implementation Trackers
Overview of Resilience Measures by Selected Global Players**

Accompanying the document





**Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions**

The 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report

{COM(2026) 46 final}

[Table of contents](#)

| | |
|---|----------|
| Annex 1 | 4 |
| Key performance indicators (KPIs) | 4 |
| 1. A functioning Single Market | 6 |
| KPI 1: Labour productivity | 6 |
| KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market..... | 7 |
| KPI 3: Simplification of EU rules | 8 |
| KPI 4: Conformity deficit | 9 |
| KPI 5: Ease of regulatory compliance | 10 |
| KPI 6: Recognition of professional qualifications | 11 |
| KPI 7: Length of standard-setting procedures | 12 |
| KPI 8: Circular material use rate..... | 13 |
| KPI 9: Product compliance monitoring..... | 14 |
| KPI 10: Services Regulation, Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index | 15 |
| KPI 11: Degree of digitalisation and cross-border accessibility | 16 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 2. Closing the innovation gap | 17 |
| KPI 12: R&D expenditure..... | 17 |
| KPI 13: Patent applications..... | 18 |
| KPI 14: Digital technologies adoption by companies..... | 19 |
| KPI 15: Employment rate | 20 |
| KPI 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition | 21 |
| KPI 17: PISA scores | 22 |
| 3. Decarbonisation of industry and investment | 23 |
| KPI 18: Private investment | 23 |
| KPI 19: Public investment | 24 |
| KPI 20: Venture capital investment..... | 25 |
| KPI 21: EU investments supporting the industrial transition..... | 26 |
| KPI 24: Electricity prices for businesses | 27 |
| KPI 23: Electrification rate | 28 |
| KPI 24: Energy from renewable sources | 29 |
| KPI 25: Annual growth in renewable electricity generation..... | 30 |
| 4. Increasing security and reducing dependencies | 31 |
| KPI 26: Trade with the rest of the world..... | 31 |
| KPI 27: The EU economy’s global market share..... | 32 |
| KPI 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity | 33 |
| KPI 29: External vulnerability | 34 |
| | |
| Annex 2 | 35 |
| Implementation trackers | 35 |
| 1. A Competitiveness Compass for the EU (adopted on 29 January 2025)..... | 35 |
| 2. The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation (adopted on 26 February 2025)..... | 38 |
| 3. The Single Market Strategy (adopted on 21 May 2025)..... | 41 |
| Annex 3 | 44 |
| Overview of resilience measures by selected global players | 44 |
| 1. Introduction | 44 |
| 2. Overview of resilience measures by category and by countries | 46 |
| 2.1 Industrial strategies, regulatory measures and crisis preparedness | 46 |
| <i>United States</i>  | 46 |
| <i>United Kingdom</i>  | 47 |
| <i>Japan</i>  | 48 |
| <i>Republic of Korea</i>  | 48 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| <i>Singapore</i> 🇸🇬 | 48 |
| <i>Australia</i> 🇦🇺 | 48 |
| <i>India</i> 🇮🇳 | 49 |
| <i>Canada</i> 🇨🇦 | 49 |
| 2.2 Financial and fiscal support (including R&D) | 49 |
| <i>United States</i> 🇺🇸 | 49 |
| <i>Canada</i> 🇨🇦 | 50 |
| <i>United Kingdom</i> 🇬🇧 | 50 |
| <i>India</i> 🇮🇳 | 50 |
| <i>Taiwan</i> 🇹🇼 | 51 |
| <i>Japan</i> 🇯🇵 | 52 |
| <i>Republic of Korea</i> 🇰🇷 | 53 |
| <i>Brazil</i> 🇧🇷 | 53 |
| 2.3 Public procurement and prioritisation measures of domestic supply of goods and services | 53 |
| <i>United States</i> 🇺🇸 | 53 |
| <i>Canada</i> 🇨🇦 | 54 |
| <i>India</i> 🇮🇳 | 54 |
| <i>China</i> 🇨🇳 | 54 |
| <i>United Kingdom</i> 🇬🇧 | 55 |
| <i>South Africa</i> 🇿🇦 | 55 |
| 2.4 Trade toolbox (tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, FDI control, etc.).. | 55 |
| <i>United States</i> 🇺🇸 | 55 |
| <i>Canada</i> 🇨🇦 | 55 |
| <i>Australia</i> 🇦🇺 | 56 |
| <i>India</i> 🇮🇳 | 56 |
| <i>China</i> 🇨🇳 | 56 |
| <i>Japan</i> 🇯🇵 | 57 |
| 2.5 International deals and partnerships | 57 |
| BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS | 57 |
| <i>United States</i> 🇺🇸 | 57 |
| <i>United Kingdom</i> 🇬🇧 | 61 |
| <i>Australia</i> 🇦🇺 | 62 |
| <i>India</i> 🇮🇳 | 62 |
| <i>Japan</i> 🇯🇵 | 63 |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| <i>Republic of Korea</i> 🇰🇷 | 63 |
| <i>Vietnam</i> 🇻🇳 | 63 |
| PLURILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS | 63 |

Annex 1

Key performance indicators (KPIs)

Table 1: Summary of KPIs¹

| Legend: | Improvement year-on-year | Stable | Worsening year-on-year | Single observation |
|---|---|--------|--|--------------------|
| KPI | What it measures | | Latest EU values | |
| A functioning Single Market | | | | |
| KPI 1: Labour productivity | GDP per hour worked in PPP terms. | | At 78.5% of US levels (2024) At 78.0% of US levels (2023) | |
| KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market | Share of EU GDP represented by trade between EU Member States. | | 22.0% for goods (2024) 23.5% for goods (2023) 7.9% for services (2024) 7.7% for services (2023) | |
| KPI 3: Simplification of EU rules | Projected annual administrative savings from Commission's omnibus simplification proposals and other initiatives. | | EUR 15 bn (2025) | |
| KPI 4: Conformity deficit | Share of transposed EU Single Market Directives for which infringement proceedings for incorrect transposition were launched. Target ≤ 0.5%. | | 1.1% (2025) 0.9% (2024) | |
| KPI 5: Ease of regulatory compliance | Replies to the survey question: '...how easy is it for companies to comply with government regulation and administrative requirements ² ?' | | 3.89 out of 7 (2025) 3.66 out of 7 (2024) | |
| KPI 6: Recognition of professional qualifications | Positive recognition rates as % (EU average) of all received requests for recognition of professional qualifications. | | 82.2% (2023) 77.3% (2022) | |
| KPI 7: Length of standard-setting procedures | Average length (in years) of the drafting stage of standards. | | 4.0 (2024) 3.2 (2023) | |
| KPI 8: Circular material use rate | Material recovered and fed back into the economy, as a share of the overall use of material. Target = 24% in 2030. | | 12.2% (2024) 12.1% (2023) | |
| KPI 9: Product compliance monitoring | Median number of product investigations per million inhabitants in EU Member States ³ . | | 102 (2024) 82 (2023) | |
| KPI 10: Services trade restrictiveness | Restrictiveness of regulation in selected service sectors ⁴ . | | 4.2% (2024) 4.2% (2023) | |
| KPI 11: Digitalisation of Single Market relevant procedures | Share of Single Market relevant administrative procedures that are fully online for national and cross-border users. | | 20.6% (2024) | |
| Closing the innovation gap | | | | |
| KPI 12: R&D expenditure | Total private and public expenditure in research and development as a share of GDP. Target = Above 3% by 2030. | | 2.24% (2024) 2.26% (2023) | |
| KPI 13: Patent applications | Patent applications per million inhabitants ⁵ . | | 152 (2024) 153 (2023) | |
| KPI 14: Digital technologies adoption by companies | Share of European enterprises that have taken up cloud computing services, data analytics and/or Artificial Intelligence. | | Artificial intelligence: 20% (2025), 13.5% (2024) Data analytics: | |

¹ KPIs focus on EU averages and the performances of EU Member States. When useful, comparisons are made to global peers. The [Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard](#), that includes additional indicators, also includes to a limited extent data for the members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), and enlargement countries.

² Index values from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater ease of doing business.

³ Measuring product investigations carried out by market surveillance authorities which are notified in the *Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance*.

⁴ [OECD's STRI](#) showing the share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services being present in selected sectors.

⁵ Patent applications submitted to the European Patent Office.

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| | Target = 75% by 2030. | 39.9% (2025), 33.2% (2023) Cloud computing services: 46.7% (2025), 38.9% (2023) |
| KPI 15: Employment rate | The share of working-age people employed. Target = 78% by 2030. | 75.8% (2024) 75.3% (2023) |
| KPI 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition | Number of occupations requiring specific skills for the green transition where at least five Member States reported a shortage. | 25 (2024) 13 (2023) |
| KPI 17: PISA score | 15-year-olds' performance in the OECD's PISA tests. High scores indicate better performance. | Maths: 474 (2022), 492 (2018) Reading: 475 (2022), 488 (2018) Science: 484 (2022), 488 (2018) |
| Decarbonisation of industry and investment | | |
| KPI 18: Private investment | Private investment (share of GDP). | 17.6% (2024) 18.6% (2023) |
| KPI 19: Public investment | Public investment (share of GDP). | 3.7% (2024) 3.6% (2023) |
| KPI 20: Venture capital investment | Venture capital investment (share of GDP). | 0.06% (2024) 0.06% (2023) |
| KPI 21: EU investments supporting industrial transition | Cumulative volume of InvestEU investments supporting industrial transition. | EUR 115.5bn (Jun 2025) EUR 52.7 bn (Jun 2024) |
| KPI 22: Electricity prices for non-household consumers | Electricity prices for non-household consumers (EU ID price band, large commercial users) ⁶ . | EUR 0.164 per kWh (2025) EUR 0.163 per kWh (2024) |
| KPI 23: Electrification | Electricity as a share of the total (final) energy consumption. Objective = 32% in 2030⁷. | 22.9% (2023) 22.9% of (2022) |
| KPI 24: Share of energy from renewable sources | Renewable energy generation as a share of the overall energy consumption. Target = 42.5% in 2030. | 25.2% (2024) 24.5% (2023) |
| KPI 25: Annual growth in renewable electricity generation | The annually added capacity to generate renewable electricity. Objective = + 100 GW⁸. | +68 GW (2024) +67 GW (2023) |
| Increasing security and reducing dependencies | | |
| KPI 26: Trade with the rest of the world as share of GDP | The EU's degree of economic integration with the rest of the world. | 13.9 % for goods (2024) 14.7% for goods (2023) 8.1% for services (2024) 7.8% for services (2023) |
| KPI 27: Exports of goods and services as a share of worldwide imports | The EU economy's market share. | 12.6% for goods (2024) 11.9% for goods (2023) 25.0% for services (2024) 25.4% for services (2023) |
| KPI 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity | The share of clean tech components tracked under the Net-Zero Industry Act that meet the benchmark domestic manufacturing rate. Target = 100% of the tracked components. | 6 out of 27 (22%) technology components exceed the benchmark manufacturing rate (2024) |
| KPI 29: External vulnerability | External vulnerabilities for strategically important industrial products ⁹ . | 0.20 (2023) 0.19 (2022) |

⁶ Electricity prices here exclude levies and taxes that companies can recover.

⁷ This objective was set by the Commission in its "Clean industrial Deal" Communication.

⁸ This objective was set by the Commission in its "Clean industrial Deal" Communication.

⁹ Combined vulnerability to external shocks of product categories within the scope of the Clean Industrial Deal, including semiconductors, net-zero technologies, raw materials, basic metals, chemicals, machinery and motor vehicles. Measured on a scale from 0 to 1. Higher value = bigger vulnerability.

This annex zooms in on each of the Report’s 29 KPIs, showing the evolution of EU performance over time and data by individual Member State as available. It includes the latest available data for each KPI, with data sources last accessed on 15 January 2026.


1. A functioning Single Market

KPI 1: Labour productivity

KPI 1 shows the trend in labour productivity, meaning the economic output per hour worked in the economy (in PPS terms). EU indexed at 100 for 2024.

The EU shows a persistent productivity gap in relation to the US, with labour productivity significantly below US levels for the past 30 years, currently 21% lower.

Figure 1: Labour productivity in the EU and other advanced economies.




Source: European Commission services calculations based on AMECO database, series: UVGD PPS and NLHT

KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market

KPI 2 shows the trend in cross-border trade flows in goods and services within the EU Single Market as a share of total EU GDP. Trade is measured by the average of imports and exports.

Since the creation of the Single Market in 1993, trade in goods and services as share of GDP has steadily risen. After a strong increase in 2022, trade in goods has fallen back to pre-2022 levels. Disaggregated trade data suggest that these changes can, to a great extent, be attributed to trade fluctuations in energy products, linked to the significant price volatility in the wake of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Trade in services continues to expand, albeit at a slow pace, after its pandemic-related dip.

Figure 2: Integration in the Single Market: Intra-EU trade in goods and services.



Source: Eurostat

The indicator only covers intra-EU trade. If considering trade with non-EU EEA partners (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), values for Member States with significant trade ties to non-EU EEA countries would be higher.

National data, intra-EU goods, % of GDP (2024)

| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| 29.7 | 51.2 | 27.0 | 12.7 | 53.9 | 19.7 | 18.1 | 37.8 | 15.0 | 15.3 | 17.2 | 13.0 | 28.8 | 51.1 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 12.8 | 14.7 | 33.8 | 19.3 | 38.9 | 16.1 | 40.3 | 29.3 | 23.8 | 22.3 | 19.3 | 54.0 | 63.9 | 22.0 |

National data, intra-EU services (excluding financial services and transport for national data), % of GDP (2024)

| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
|------|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
| 9.3 | 10.8 | 4.8 | 16.2 | 5.6 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 13.9 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 4.4 | 10.9 | 7.0 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 17.4 | 2.9 | 7.5 | 38.4 | 7.4 | 36.8 | 9.1 | 4.8 | 6.7 | 5.2 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 4.8 | 7.9 |

KPI 3: Simplification of EU rules


KPI 3 measures the projected annually recurring administrative savings expected from the Omnibus simplification proposals and other initiatives¹⁰, at the time of their adoption by the Commission. It shows the accumulated expected savings of these proposals put forward up until the end of December 2025.

In 2025, the Commission has proposed ten Omnibus proposals and other initiatives which are projected to reduce the recurrent administrative annual costs by EUR 15 bn, of which EUR 11.9 bn from omnibus proposals¹¹ and EUR 3.1 bn from other initiatives. Moreover, new initiatives, such as European Business Wallet Regulation has a potential to contribute significantly to the overall administrative cost reduction for businesses and public administrations, with minimum EUR 13.5 bn. These savings were estimated using the EU standard cost model.

Administrative burdens have been estimated at EUR 150 bn per year. The Commission targets to reduce these by at least 25% (amounting to EUR 37.5 bn) for all businesses and by at least 35% for SMEs.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of addressing overly complex EU rules – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

Figure 3: Savings expected from Commission’s Omnibus simplification packages and other initiatives: towards a 25% reduction in recurrent administrative burden.



Source: European Commission services, [Simplification - European Commission](#)

¹⁰ Other initiatives (14) are those resulting in administrative cost savings for businesses and public administrations at the time of their adoption by the Commission. They cover targeted revisions of existing EU acquis (e.g SFDR Review or Targeted revision of the EU rules for medical devices and in-vitro diagnostics).

¹¹ All information about the Omnibus simplification proposals presented by the Commission is available at [Simplification - European Commission](#).

KPI 4: Conformity deficit

KPI 4 measures the share of transposed Single Market directives for which the Commission has launched infringement proceedings due to incorrect transposition. It is expressed as percentage of the number of Single Market directives notified to the Commission as ‘transposed’ or ‘not requiring any further implementation measures’.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of addressing the lack of Single Market ownership by Member States – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

The conformity deficit increased to 1.1% in 2025, remaining much above the target of 0.5%, with wide variation among Member States.

Figure 4a: Conformity deficit: share of incorrectly transposed Single Market Directives.





Figure 4b: Evolution of the EU average conformity deficit.



Source: European Commission services


KPI 5: Ease of regulatory compliance

KPI 5 measures companies’ perceived ease of regulatory compliance by tracking the results of replies to the following survey question: ‘In your country, how easy is it for companies to comply with government regulatory and administrative requirements (e.g. permits, reporting, legislation) (1 = Overly complex; 7 = Extremely easy)?’ Higher values indicate a better performance, i.e. less burdensome regulation.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of easing business operations, since complicated business establishment and operations due to regulation is one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

According to the World Economic Forum the ease of regulatory compliance in the EU has been broadly stable over the past years.

Figure 5: Ease of regulatory compliance: Companies’ perception of the ease of doing business.



Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2025)

National data (2025)

| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| 3.05 | 4.51 | 4.04 | 4.33 | 3.02 | 3.99 | 3.89 | 3.99 | 3.19 | 2.74 | 5.15 | 4.18 | 2.82 | 2.99 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 4.59 | 3.69 | 5.05 | 4.85 | 3.0 | 4.07 | 3.94 | 3.18 | 3.21 | 3.16 | 4.98 | 2.57 | 2.67 | 3.89 |

KPI 6: Recognition of professional qualifications

KPI 6 measures response rates (positive, pending and negative) of all the requests received for recognition of professional qualifications. Such requests are made when a person having a professional qualification certified in their home Member State seeks to get their qualifications recognised in another Member State in order to work there.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of simplifying recognition of professional qualifications – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

Of the initiated recognition procedures, in 2023, 10% are pending a decision, while 8% have resulted in a negative decision, with considerable differences across Member States¹².

Figure 6a: Recognition of professional qualifications per Member State.





Figure 6b: Evolution of the EU average of recognition decisions.



Source: European Commission services calculations based on the Regulated professions database

¹² Data cut off in 2023. At the time of publication, not all Member States had reported their 2024 data, with less than half of the usual observations reported.


KPI 7: Length of standard-setting procedures

KPI 7 measures the average length in years of the drafting stage of standards.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of speeding up standard-setting procedures – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

The European standardisation system is hindered by the slow pace of the standard development process, which fails to meet market and legislative needs, particularly for new technologies. Over the past decade, the average time needed to establish a new standard has gradually increased, which weighs on the competitiveness of EU industry. Several factors contribute to this slow pace, including outdated working methods and the underuse of digital technologies¹³.

Figure 7: Average length of the drafting stage in standard-setting procedures.



Source: European Commission services, [Evaluation study of the regulation \(EU\) 1025/2012 on European standardisation - Publications Office of the EU](#)

¹³ In June 2025, the Commission presented an evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation. SWD(2025) 170 final.

KPI 8: Circular material use rate

KPI 8 measures the degree of the economy’s circularity by looking at the rate of use of secondary materials as share of the overall demand for materials. When secondary raw materials replace primary materials in the economy, they reduce pressure on primary resources and limit waste. A higher rate indicates a higher degree of circularity.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of harmonising today’s fragmented rules on packaging, labelling and waste – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

The share of material brought back into the economy out of the overall use of materials goes up slowly, from 12.1% in 2023 to 12.2% in 2024, but is still well below the target of 24% in 2030.

Figure 8a: Circular material use rate by Member State.





Figure 8b: Evolution of the EU average circular material use rate.



Source: Eurostat

KPI 9: Product compliance monitoring

KPI 9 measures the number of product investigations carried out by market surveillance authorities per million inhabitants in EU Member States¹⁴.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of modernising product rules and addressing the lack of product compliance – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

EU market surveillance is characterised by low, if increasing, number of investigations notified by national authorities.

Figure 9a: Product compliance investigations conducted per million inhabitants.





Figure 9b: Evolution of EU product compliance investigations.



Source: European Commission services

¹⁴ Measuring product investigations carried out by market surveillance authorities which are notified in the *Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance*.

KPI 10: Services Regulation, Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index

KPI 10 measures the level of restrictiveness of regulation in selected services sectors (construction services, courier services, architecture services, engineering services, legal services). The values are based on the OECD’s intra-EEA STRI questionnaire¹⁵ and show the share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services that are present in selected sectors. They are available for 22 of the 27 EU Member States.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of addressing restrictive and diverging national regulations on services – another of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy.

Based on the indicator, the level of restrictiveness has remained stable in recent years, despite efforts to remove restrictions.

Figure 10a: Services Regulation, Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index for selected sectors by EU Member State.





Figure 10b: Evolution of the EU average in the Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.



Source: OECD

¹⁵ [OECD's STRI](#) showing the share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services in selected sectors.


KPI 11: Degree of digitalisation and cross-border accessibility

KPI 11 measures the share of Single Market relevant administrative procedures required under the Single Digital Gateway Regulation to be online, that are fully online for both national and cross-border users. This includes aspects such as authentication and payment¹⁶.

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of digitalising the Single Market, as proposed by the Single Market Strategy.

The Single Digital Gateway (SDG) Regulation¹⁷ sets out the main e-government entry point, Your Europe, which citizens and businesses can use to access reliable and multilingual information on rights, obligations, and administrative procedures in all EU countries. It also provides links to national portals and online services to complete key procedures digitally. Progress on SDG implementation varies across Member States. On average, in 2024, only 21% of procedures required to be online, were fully online for both national and cross-border users as per the specific requirements set out in Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the SDG Regulation. Based on the previous methodology that only measures the compliance with the requirement contained in Article 13.2(b) of the SDG Regulation, i.e. that the cross-border users are able to submit the required information, 54% of relevant procedures complied with this requirement¹⁸.

Figure 11: Degree of digitalisation and cross-border accessibility of administrative procedures.



Source: European Commission services

¹⁶ [Digital Decade 2025: eGovernment Benchmark 2025 | Shaping Europe’s digital future](#)

¹⁷ [Regulation - 2018/1724 - EN - EUR-Lex](#)

¹⁸ A lower score under the new methodology should not be interpreted as a deterioration in Member State performance but it reflects the introduction of a more accurate measurement framework.


2. Closing the innovation gap

KPI 12: R&D expenditure

KPI 12 tracks trends in the combined annual private and public-sector expenditure in research and development (R&D) as a share of GDP for the EU, US, UK, Japan and China.

The EU's total private and public-sector R&D expenditure reached 2.24% of GDP in 2024, still below the 3% target. Progress over the past 10 years remains modest. Comparing R&D expenditure with other major economies, the EU continues to trail behind the US, China, and Japan.

Figure 12: Research and development expenditure in the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: Eurostat; World Bank

National data (2024)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 3.26 | 3.36 | 0.77 | 0.65 | 1.82 | 3.13 | 3.01 | 1.99 | 1.54 | 1.5 | 3.22 | 2.18 | 1.35 | 1.31 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 1.38 | 1.38 | 1.04 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 0.51 | 2.29 | 1.41 | 1.72 | 0.46 | 3.57 | 2.16 | 0.98 | 2.24 |


KPI 13: Patent applications

KPI 13 tracks the number of patent applications per million inhabitants in the EU, US, UK, Japan and China. Figure 14 shows i) the number of patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) by EU applicants per million inhabitants; and ii) the number of patents filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) per million inhabitants by applicants' country of residence.

The number of EPO and PCT patent applications should not be directly compared because each system provides a different geographical scope of protection. Nonetheless, they are telling indicators of the degree of innovation in different countries.

The number of PCT patent applications filed by EU applicants fell from 104 per million inhabitants in 2022 to 98 in 2023. Similar, patent applications fell in the UK, with even steeper drops seen in the United States, Japan and China. In 2023, EU applicants still filed fewer PCT patents per capita than Japan (358 per million) and the United States (156), but more than China (40) and the UK (80).

Figure 13: Patent applications in the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: Eurostat; OECD; World Bank

National data (2024), patent applications to the EPO per million inhabitants

| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
|-----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|-----|----|----|----|-----|-----|----|------------|
| 234 | 221 | 8 | 64 | 23 | 299 | 425 | 53 | 10 | 45 | 428 | 160 | 10 | 15 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 209 | 82 | 25 | 457 | 19 | 110 | 393 | 19 | 33 | 3 | 468 | 73 | 11 | 152 |

KPI 14: Digital technologies adoption by companies

KPI 14 measures the degree to which companies are adopting three key digital technologies: artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics, and cloud.

The AI series tracks the percentage of businesses employing 10 or more people using at least one AI technology. The data analytics series shows the percentage of businesses using data analytics tools. The cloud series tracks the percentage of businesses purchasing at least one intermediate or sophisticated cloud computing service. The indicator is calculated for all businesses in manufacturing and service sectors, excluding the financial sector.

By 2025, the rate of adoption of AI, cloud and/or dataanalytics by businesses in the EU had improved, but it remains well below the 75% target for 2030.

Figure 14a: Digital technologies adoption by companies in the Member States.





Figure 14b: Evolution of the EU average digital technologies adoption by companies.




Source: European Commission services, Digital Economy and Society Index

KPI 15: Employment rate

KPI 15 shows the trends in employment rates of people of working- age between 20 to 64 in the EU, US, UK and Japan.

Employment rates in the EU are steadily increasing and on track to meet the EU’s headline target of 78% in 2030. The EU employment rate reached a record high of 75.8% in 2024, driven partly by increasing participation of older people, women and migrants in the work force. This performance is mostly in line with the US, but below the trends seen in Japan and the UK.

Figure 15: Employment rate in the EU and other advanced economies.



Sources: EU: Eurostat; EU Labour Force Survey (2024); Japan, UK, USA: Labour Force Survey

National data (2024)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 77.4 | 72.3 | 76.8 | 79.8 | 82.3 | 81.3 | 80.2 | 81.8 | 69.3 | 71.4 | 77.0 | 75.1 | 73.6 | 81.1 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 79.8 | 67.1 | 79.2 | 74.2 | 77.4 | 83.0 | 83.5 | 78.4 | 78.5 | 69.5 | 81.9 | 78.3 | 78.1 | 75.8 |


KPI 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition

KPI 16 shows the number of occupations requiring specific skills or knowledge for the green transition where at least five Member States reported a shortage. Occupations are considered relevant for the green transition if they require at least three green skills.¹⁹

This KPI tracks progress against the objective laid down in the Clean Industrial Deal of reducing the number of occupations relevant for the green transition with labour shortage.

The green transition is expected to create between 1 and 2.5 million additional jobs by 2030 in the EU²⁰. However, many of these new jobs will be in sectors that already face labour shortages. The number of occupations with labour shortages has doubled in just one year. Such occupations include plumbers and pipe fitters (shortages in 20 Member States), insulation workers, civil engineers and air conditioning and refrigeration mechanics (14), civil engineering technicians (12) and roofers (11). They require technical and manual expertise essential to the green transition.

Figure 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition.



Source: European Commission services

¹⁹The concept of green skills refers to the knowledge, abilities, values and attitudes needed to live in, develop and support a society which reduces the impact of human activity on the environment (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Cedefop; see: [Green skills labelling in ESCO | European Skills, Competences, Qualifications and Occupations \(ESCO\)](#)).


²⁰ Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2023 (ESDE 2023).

KPI 17: PISA scores

KPI 17 tracks 15-year-olds’ performance in the OECD’s PISA tests covering maths, reading and science. Figure 18 shows the PISA scores for 2022, 2018 and 2015 for the EU, US, UK, Japan and China. The data for the EU are the average scores for the 27 Member States, weighted by the number of 15-year-olds enrolled in education.

The EU’s average PISA scores have fallen in all disciplines and EU students underperform compared to their peers in the UK, the US, Japan and China²¹.

Figure 17: PISA scores for the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: OECD PISA database

²¹ The latest available PISA data are from 2022. Results from PISA 2025 are scheduled for publication in 2026.


3. Decarbonisation of industry and investment

KPI 18: Private investment

KPI 18 tracks the trends in private-sector investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a share of annual GDP for the EU, US and UK. The data refer to the increase in the capital stock owned by companies and individuals, including equipment, land, houses and other buildings, and intangible assets such as R&D.

Private-sector investment fell by 3.2% in 2024. As a result, private investment as a share of GDP also fell to 17.6% of GDP in 2024 and is now on par with US levels, after being broadly stable and higher than in the US in recent years.

Figure 18: Private-sector investment in the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: AMECO database

National data, % of GDP (2024)


| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 19.6 | 21.1 | 15.2 | 17.8 | 21.8 | 17.4 | 20.2 | 17.7 | 12.4 | 17.6 | 17.6 | 17.8 | 20.0 | 18.8 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 14.8 | 18.6 | 18.2 | 10.7 | 16.1 | 15.3 | 16.6 | 12.2 | 17.7 | 19.4 | 19.6 | 15.8 | 16.9 | 17.6 |

KPI 19: Public investment

KPI 19 tracks the trends in public-sector investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a share of annual GDP in the EU, US and UK. Public-sector investment is a measure of how much money a country spends to increase the value of fixed assets (for example, road infrastructure, buildings and equipment).

Public-sector investment in 2024 edged up to 3.7% of GDP confirming the positive trend over the last years. This share and the trend are broadly similar to those seen in the US (3.4% of GDP), and higher than in the UK (3.2%).

Figure 19: Public-sector investment in the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: AMECO database

National data, % of GDP (2024)


| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 3.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 4.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 6.2 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 4.3 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 2.6 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 6.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.8 | 2.7 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.1 | 3.6 | 3.7 |

KPI 20: Venture capital investment

KPI 20 tracks venture capital investments as a share of GDP.

Venture capital investment in the EU remains at very low levels, equal to 0.06% of GDP in 2024. Many innovative, fast-growing companies depend on risk capital in the form of venture investments for their expansion. Measured as share of GDP, EU venture capital investment is estimated to remain just one-tenth the size of investment levels in the US and one-quarter of investment levels in China.

Figure 20: Venture capital investment in the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: European Commission services based on Invest Europe; Eurostat; OECD; Statista

National data, % of GDP (2024)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.06 |


KPI 21: EU investments supporting the industrial transition

KPI 21 shows the cumulative volume of InvestEU investments supporting industry's green and digital transition since the programme became operational in 2021.

This KPI tracks progress against the objective laid down in the Clean Industrial Deal of increasing the cumulative volume of investment supporting industrial the transition from EUR 52.7 billion (value as of June 2024).

As of June 2025 EU investments supporting the industrial transition amounted to EUR 115.5 billion.

Figure 21: EU investments supporting the industrial green and digital transition.



Source: European Commission services, InvestEU indicators²²

²² https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-fund/investeu-indicators_en InvestEU Indicators - InvestEU - European Union.

KPI 22: Electricity prices for businesses

KPI 22 tracks non-household retail electricity prices in the EU, US, UK and Japan. It gives an idea of energy costs and cost-competitiveness, especially for industries where electricity prices make up a significant proportion of total energy costs.


Non-household retail electricity prices in the EU are broken down into two consumption bands. Prices are measured in EUR per kWh, excluding value added tax and other duties that companies can recover.

The IC consumption band covers medium-sized consumers with an annual consumption of between 500 MWh and 2 000 MWh, i.e. the vast majority of small-sized companies in services and manufacturing sectors, and gives an insight into affordability.

The ID consumption band covers large consumers with an annual consumption of between 2 000 MWh and 20 000 MWh, such as companies in electricity-intensive manufacturing sectors, and gives an insight into their international competitiveness.

In the first semester of 2025, electricity prices for large industrial users in the ID band were EUR 0.16 /KWh. This is lower than the peak seen in 2023, but since then electricity prices have seemingly stabilised at historically high levels, 50% higher than 2020 levels. By contrast, US prices remained around EUR 0.07 /KWh over this period.

Figure 22: Electricity prices for businesses.



Source: Eurostat; US Energy Information Administration; UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; International Energy Agency (2025)

National data (2025) – ID price band (EUR/kWh)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.23 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.19 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 0.23 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.16 |


KPI 23: Electrification rate

KPI 23 shows the consumption of electricity as a share of the final energy consumption. Final energy consumption is the total energy consumed by end users, such as households, industry, agriculture and transport (including Intra-EU aviation, but excluding international aviation). It excludes energy used in transformation processes, fuels used for non-energy purposes and energy used by the energy sector.

This KPI tracks progress against the objective laid down in the Clean Industrial Deal of increasing the economy-wide electrification rate to 32% by 2030.

The share of electrification has remained unchanged at around 23% over the last decade²³.

Figure 23: Evolution of the EU average electrification rate.



Source: Eurostat

National data, % (2023)

| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| 22.3 | 21.7 | 27.1 | 26.1 | 21.3 | 21.7 | 20.2 | 22.6 | 26.6 | 24.7 | 28.4 | 26.7 | 20.3 | 21.5 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 24.5 | 22.2 | 16.5 | 17.8 | 14.3 | 39.7 | 23.0 | 16.6 | 25.9 | 15.4 | 33.2 | 23.5 | 19.9 | 23.0 |


²³ At the time of publication, no data were available for 2024.

KPI 24: Energy from renewable sources

KPI 24 tracks the share of energy from renewable sources as a share of the total (final) energy consumption in the EU, US, UK, Japan and China.

Renewable energy generation accounted for 25.2% of total energy consumption in 2024. Progress has been strong in the electricity sector, with the share of renewables increasing from 37.4% in 2020 to 47.5% in 2024. Progress was more limited in heating and cooling sector (rising from 23.0% to 26.7%) and transport sector (from 10.3% to 11.%).²⁴

Figure 24: Share of renewable energy in the EU and other advanced economies.



Source: Eurostat; European Commission services

National data, % (2024)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU |
| 43.0 | 14.3 | 23.2 | 21.9 | 19.2 | 22.5 | 46.8 | 41.0 | 25.3 | 25.4 | 50.7 | 23.2 | 27.5 | 18.3 |
| IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | EU |
| 16.1 | 19.3 | 35.4 | 14.7 | 45.5 | 17.2 | 20.2 | 17.7 | 36.5 | 25.4 | 62.8 | 24.6 | 18.1 | 25.2 |

²⁴ Further info and detailed assessment can be found in the recently published state of the energy union report: Assessment of progress towards the Energy Union and Climate Action objectives (SWD) - Energy.


KPI 25: Annual growth in renewable electricity generation

KPI 25 measures the annually added capacity (in GW) to generate renewable electricity.

This KPI tracks progress against the objective laid down in the Clean Industrial Deal of installing at least 100 GW of new renewable energy per year.

The capacity added every year to generate renewable electricity has been accelerating: it was around 68 GW in 2024, more than double the value of 2020.

Figure 25: Annual growth in EU installed renewable electricity generation capacity.



Source: European Commission services²⁵. The objective refers to yearly capacity needed in the next 5 years to reach the 2030 renewable energy target.

²⁵ Solar capacity additions are presented in AC (alternating current) as this reflects the maximum power that can be delivered to the electricity grid at any given time. In cases where primary sources (e.g. industry reports) report solar capacity in DC (direct current) these values are downscaled to AC using a factor of 1.2.


4. Increasing security and reducing dependencies

KPI 26: Trade with the rest of the world

KPI 26 tracks the EU's degree of economic integration with the rest of the world by measuring trade flows in goods and services with the rest of the world as shares of total EU GDP. Trade is measured by the average of imports and exports.

The long-term trend shows growing trade integration with the rest of the world, but there are signals pointing towards a slow-down or even a reversal. EU trade in goods with the rest of the world continued to decline for the second year in row. The average of extra-EU imports and exports of goods corresponded to 13.9% of GDP in 2024. While it can to some degree be attributed to energy price fluctuations, it also shows the trend of a deteriorating global trading climate. EU trade integration in services with the rest of the world has equally slowed but remains on an increasing trajectory.

Figure 26: EU trade in goods and services with the rest of the world as shares of GDP.



Source: Eurostat

KPI 27: The EU economy’s global market share

KPI 27 tracks the EU economy’s global market share by measuring EU exports in goods and services as shares of total global imports.

Figures 27a and 27b show the exports of goods and services of the EU, US, UK, Japan and China as shares of global imports. They show the relative size of exports from the EU and from those four countries in the global market. A higher percentage indicates a greater role in the global economy, and a lower percentage indicates a smaller global market share.

The EU’s share in global trade remains stable, but pressure on the manufacturing industry is building up. EU exports of goods as a share of global imports stand slightly above the levels of 10 years ago and shows remarkable resilience.

For exports of services, the outlook is more encouraging, despite a small decline over the last year, with the past 10 years having seen the EU’s global market share grow to reach 25% of global trade in services, cementing the EU’s position as the top global exporter of services.

Figure 27a: Exports of goods as a share of total global imports.





Figure 27b: Exports of services as a share of total global imports.



Source: Eurostat


KPI 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity

KPI 28 measures the share of clean tech components tracked under the Net-Zero Industry Act that meet the benchmark of meeting 40% of EU consumption by domestic manufacturing. The objective is for 100% of components to reach this benchmark.

This KPI tracks progress against the objective laid down in the Clean Industrial Deal of increasing the domestic manufacturing capacity for clean tech products.

Looking at products within the scope of the Net-Zero Industry Act²⁶, EU manufacturing currently surpasses the benchmark of meeting 40% of EU consumption by domestic manufacturing in 6 of the 27 (22%) monitored technology areas²⁷. However, for the vast majority of monitored key components in battery technologies, electrolysers, hydrogen and solar, EU manufacturing capacity still significantly trails the benchmark. The situation is particularly concerning in battery technologies where the EU has no capacity to manufacture anode active materials and can only meet 4% of EU domestic demand for cathode active materials²⁸.

Figure 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity: Status on the way towards the 2030 benchmark manufacturing rate.



Source: European Commission services

²⁶ [Net-Zero Industry Act](#).

²⁷ Comprehensive data collection began in 2024, which is why earlier timelines are not available. Wind power technologies exceed the benchmark manufacturing rate by between 260% and 175%. Solar photovoltaic inverters exceed it by 435%. Electrolyser stacks exceed it by 215%.

²⁸ European Commission. For more information about domestic manufacturing of key net-zero technologies, consult the section on [Global trade & economic security](#) in the Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard.


KPI 29: External vulnerability

KPI 29 assesses the combined vulnerability to external shocks of strategically important industrial products. The selected products include semiconductors, net-zero technologies, raw materials, basic metals, chemicals, machinery and motor vehicles. The index quantifies the degree of vulnerability using scores that range from 0 (low vulnerability) to 1 (high vulnerability) and it is built on two pillars: (i) the risks from foreign dependencies, examining the concentration of trade flows and reliance on foreign markets, and (ii) risks from a weak global market position, evaluating competitive strengths and weaknesses through price differences and relative comparative advantages.

This KPI tracks progress against the objective laid down in the Clean Industrial Deal of decreasing the EU’s external vulnerability.

Europe’s supply chains continue to show a significant degree of external dependencies, which carry the risk of being weaponised. An analysis has identified 204 products in sensitive ecosystems where the EU is heavily dependent on a single supplier country, and which could therefore be disrupted by an external shock. Among these products, more than half of the EU’s dependencies originate from China. The EU’s overall dependence on imports of key industrial products remains largely unchanged. Analysis of trade data for industrial products shows that the EU is significantly more exposed to external vulnerabilities than China, but less exposed than the US. Zooming in on strategically important industrial products, China has the lowest degree of external dependency with an EXVI score of 0.12, with the EU at 0.20 and the US at 0.28.²⁹

Figure 29: External vulnerability, measured by the EXVI index.



Source: European Commission services calculations (DG GROW Chief Economist Team) ; Single Market Economics Briefs: EXternal Vulnerability Index (2025)

²⁹ At the time of publication, no data were available for 2024.

























Annex 2



Implementation trackers


1. A Competitiveness Compass for the EU (adopted on 29 January 2025)¹


The expected timelines of actions have been updated in view of most recent developments.

| Status | Pillar 1 – Closing the innovation gap | Timeline |
|--------|--|------------------|
| ✓ | Start-up and scale-up strategy ² | 28 May 2025 |
| | 28 th regime (EU Inc.) | Q1 2026 |
| | European Innovation Act | Q1 2026 |
| | European Research Area Act | Q3 2026 |
| ✓ | AI continent action plan ³ | 9 April 2025 |
| ✓ | Apply AI strategy ⁴ | 18 October 2025 |
| ✓ | AI in science strategy ⁵ | 18 October 2025 |
| ✓ | Data Union strategy ⁶ | 19 November 2025 |
| | EU Cloud and AI Development Act | Q1 2026 |
| ✓ | Quantum Europe strategy ⁷ | 2 July 2025 |
| | Quantum Act | Q2 2026 |
| ⊙ | European Biotech Act ⁸ (Part I) | 16 December 2025 |
| | European Biotech Act (Part II) | Q3 2026 |
| ✓ | Bioeconomy strategy ⁹ | 27 November 2025 |
| ✓ | Life Sciences strategy ¹⁰ | 2 July 2025 |
| | Advanced Materials Act | Q4 2026 |
| ⊙ | Space Act ¹¹ | 25 June 2025 |
| | Review of the EU merger guidelines | Q4 2026 |
| ⊙ | Digital Networks Act ¹² | 21 January 2026 |
| Status | Pillar 2 – A joint roadmap for decarbonisation and competitiveness | Timeline |
| ✓ | Clean Industrial Deal ¹³ | 26 February 2025 |
| ✓ | Action plan for affordable energy ¹⁴ | 26 February 2025 |
| | Industrial Accelerator Act | Q1 2026 |
| | Electrification action plan | Q1 2026 |
| ⊙ | European grids package ¹⁵ | 10 December 2025 |
| ✓ | Clean Industrial Deal State aid framework (CISAF) ¹⁶ | 25 June 2025 |

| | | |
|---|--|-----------------------------------|
|  | Steel and metals action plan ¹⁷ | 19 March 2025 |
|  | Chemicals industry package: (1) Action plan for the chemicals industry ¹⁸ | 8 July 2025 |
|  | ... and (2) Simplification Omnibus VI on chemicals ¹⁹ | 8 July 2025 |
|  | Strategic dialogue on the future of the European automotive industry | 30 January 2025 |
|  | Industrial action plan for the European automotive sector ²⁰ | 5 March 2025 |
|  | Sustainable transport investment plan ²¹ | 5 November 2025 |
| | European port strategy and industrial maritime strategy | Q1 2026 |
|  | High-speed rail action plan ²² | 5 November 2025 |
|  | Review of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) ²³ | 17 December 2025 |
| | Circular Economy Act | Q3 2026 |
|  | Vision for agriculture and food ²⁴ | 19 February 2025 |
|  | Oceans Pact ²⁵ | 5 June 2025 |
|  | Amendment of the Climate Law ²⁶ | 2 July 2025 |
| Status | Pillar 3 – Reducing excessive dependencies and increasing security | Timeline |
| | Conclude and implement ambitious trade agreements, clean trade and investment partnerships | Ongoing ²⁷ |
|  | Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation initiative ²⁸ | Q4 2025 |
|  | Joint purchasing platform for Critical Raw Minerals ²⁹ | 2 July 2025 |
| | Revision of directives on public procurement | Q2 2026 |
|  | White Paper for European Defence ³⁰ | 19 March 2025 |
|  | Preparedness Union strategy ³¹ | 26 March 2025 |
|  | Internal security strategy ³² | 2 April 2025 |
|  | Critical Medicines Act ³³ | 11 March 2025 |
| | European climate adaptation plan | Q4 2026 |
|  | Water Resilience Strategy ³⁴ | 4 June 2025 |
| Status | Horizontal enablers of competitiveness | Timeline |
|  | (1) Definition of small mid-caps (SMCs) ³⁵ ... | 21 May 2025 |
|  | ... and (2) Simplification Omnibus IV on small mid-cap companies, digitalisation and common specifications ³⁶ | 21 May 2025 |
|  | European business wallet ³⁷ | 19 November 2025 |
|  | Single Market strategy ³⁸ | 21 May 2025 |
| | Revision of the Standardisation Regulation | Q3 2026 |
|  | Savings and Investments Union ³⁹ | 19 March 2025 |
|  | Proposal for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028-2034, including the Competitiveness Fund ⁴⁰ | 16 July 2025 and 3 September 2025 |
| | Competitiveness coordination tool | Q1 2026 |

| | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------|
|  | Union of Skills ⁴¹ | 5 March 2025 |
|  | Quality jobs roadmap ⁴² | 4 December 2025 |
| | Skills Portability Initiative | Q3 2026 |

 Proposal adopted / For legal proposals, indicates adoption by both the European Parliament and the Council

 Legal proposal presented by the Commission and currently under adoption by the European Parliament and the Council

¹ COM(2025)30 final.

² COM(2025) 270 final.

³ COM(2025) 165 final.

⁴ COM(2025) 723 final.

⁵ COM(2025) 724 final.

⁶ COM(2025) 835 final.

⁷ COM(2025) 363 final.

⁸ COM(2025) 1022 final.

⁹ COM(2025) 960 final.

¹⁰ COM(2025) 525 final.

¹¹ COM(2025) 335 final.

¹² [Proposal for a Regulation for the Digital Networks Act \(DNA\) | Shaping Europe's digital future](#)

¹³ COM(2025) 85 final.

¹⁴ COM(2025) 79 final.

¹⁵ COM(2025) 1005 final.

¹⁶ C/2025/3602.

¹⁷ COM(2025) 125 final.

¹⁸ COM(2025) 530 final.

¹⁹ COM(2025)526 (adopted), COM(2025)531.

²⁰ COM(2025) 95 final.

²¹ COM(2025) 664 final.

²² COM(2025) 903 final.

²³ [Commission strengthens the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism](#)

²⁴ COM(2025) 75 final.

²⁵ COM/2025/281 final.

²⁶ COM(2025) 524 final.

²⁷ A first Clean Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and South Africa was signed on 20 November 2025.

²⁸ Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative (T-MED).

²⁹ [EU Energy and Raw Materials Platform - Energy - European Commission](#)

³⁰ [White paper for European defence - Readiness 2030 - Defence Industry and Space](#)

³¹ JOIN(2025) 130 final.

³² COM(2025) 148 final.

³³ COM(2025) 102 final.

³⁴ COM(2025) 280 final.

³⁵ COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2025/1099 of 21 May 2025 on the definition of small mid-cap enterprises.

³⁶ COM(2025)501 final, COM(2025)502 final, COM(2025)503 final, COM(2025)504 final, COM(2025)258 final.

³⁷ COM(2025) 838 final.

³⁸ COM(2025) 500 final.

³⁹ COM(2025) 124 final.

⁴⁰ All proposals available at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en

⁴¹ COM(2025) 90 final.

⁴² COM(2025) 944 final.

2. The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation (adopted on 26 February 2025)¹

The expected timelines of the actions have been updated in view of most recent developments.

| Status | Access to affordable energy and infrastructure | Timeline |
|--------|---|-----------------------------|
| ✓ | Action Plan on Affordable Energy ² | 26 February 2025 |
| ✓ | EIB pilot offering financial guarantees for PPA offtakers, with a focus on SMEs and energy-intensive industry ³ | 20 June 2025 |
| ✓ | Legislative proposal on the extension of the Gas Storage Regulation ⁴ | 5 March 2025 |
| ✓ | Clean Industrial Deal State aid framework (CISAF) ⁵ | 25 June 2025 |
| ✓ | Recommendation on network charges ⁶ | 2 July 2025 |
| | Industrial Accelerator Act: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – speed-up permitting for industrial access to energy and industrial decarbonisation | Q1 2026 |
| | Recommendation on energy taxation | Q1 2026 |
| ✓ | Guidance on CfD design, including on combining CfDs and PPAs ⁷ | 10 Decemeber 2025 |
| | Guidance on promoting remuneration of flexibility in retail contracts | Q1 2026 |
| ⊙ | European Grids Package ⁸ | 10 December 2025 |
| Status | Lead markets: boosting clean supply and demand | Timeline |
| ✓ | Delegated act on low carbon hydrogen, providing regulatory certainty to producers of low carbon hydrogen ⁹ | 8 July 2025 |
| | Industrial Accelerator Act: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – create a low-carbon product label – apply sustainability, resilience and minimum EU content requirement to public and private-sector procurement in strategic areas to ensure lead markets for low-carbon products | Q1 2026 |
| ⊙ | Communication and legislative proposal on greening corporate fleets ¹⁰ | 16 December 2025 |
| | Revision of Public Procurement Directives to mainstream the use of non-price criteria | Q2 2026 |
| Status | Public and private investment | Timeline |
| ✓ | Increase InvestEU's risk bearing capacity as part of the simplification Omnibus II on investment ¹¹ | 26 February 2025 |
| ✓ | IPCEI Design Support Hub ¹² | 9 April 2025 |
| ✓ | Clean Industrial Deal State aid framework ¹³ | 25 June 2025 |
| ✓ | Recommendation to Member States to adopt tax incentives to support the Clean Industrial Deal ¹⁴ | 2 July 2025 |
| ✓ | Flagship call for proposals under the Horizon Europe programme ¹⁵ | 11 December 2025 |
| ✓ | Pilot auction under the Innovation Fund for industrial decarbonisation ¹⁶ | 10 October 2025 |
| | Industrial Decarbonisation Bank | Q2 2026 |
| ✓ | TechEU investment programme on scale-ups with the EIB Group and private sector ¹⁷ | 20 June 2026 |
| Status | Powering the circular economy: a secure access to materials and resources | Timeline |
| ✓ | First list of Strategic Projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act ¹⁸ | 25 March 2025 & 4 June 2025 |

| | | |
|---------------|--|------------------|
| ✓ | Ecodesign for Sustainable Products and Energy Labelling Working Plan 2025–2030 ¹⁹ | 16 April 2025 |
| | EU Critical Raw Materials Centre for joint purchases and management of strategic stockpiles | Q2 2026 |
| | Circular Economy Act | Q3 2026 |
| | Green VAT initiative | Q4 2026 |
| | Trans-Regional Circularity Hubs | Q4 2026 |
| Status | Global markets and international partnerships | Timeline |
| ✓ | Launch negotiations for the first Clean Trade and Investment Partnership ²⁰ | 13 March 2025 |
| ✓ | Simplification of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as part of the simplification Omnibus I on sustainability ²¹ | 26 February 2025 |
| ✓ | Comprehensive CBAM review assessing the feasibility of extending the CBAM scope to other EU ETS sectors at risk of carbon leakage, to downstream sectors and to indirect emissions and support to exporters, closing loopholes ²² | 17 December 2025 |
| ✓ | Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean tech cooperation initiative ²³ | Q4 2025 |
| ⊙ | Legislative proposal on an extension of the CBAM ²⁴ | 17 December 2025 |
| | Guidelines on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation ²⁵ | 9 January 2026 |
| Status | Skills and quality jobs for social fairness | Timeline |
| ✓ | Union of Skills ²⁶ | 5 March 2025 |
| ✓ | Quality Jobs Roadmap ²⁷ | 4 December 2025 |
| | European Fair Transition Observatory | Q1 2026 |
| | Skills Portability Initiative | Q3 2026 |
| | Review of State aid GBER rules for social enterprises and for the recruitment of disadvantaged workers | Q4 2026 |



Proposal adopted / For legal proposals, indicates adoption by both the European Parliament and the Council



Legal proposal presented by the Commission and currently under adoption by the European Parliament and the Council

¹ COM(2025) 85 final.

² COM(2025) 79 final.

³ [EIB Group increases 2025 financing ceiling to record €100 billion to step up investments in security and defence, energy grids and Europe's tech leadership](#)

⁴ Regulation (EU) 2025/1733.

⁵ C(2025)3602.

⁶ C/2026/126.

⁷ C(2025)8479.

⁸ Several initiatives listed here: [Commission proposes upgrade of the EU's energy infrastructure to lower bills and boost independence](#)

⁹ Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2359.

¹⁰ COM(2022) 548 ; COM(2020) 789.

¹¹ Regulation (EU) 2025/2005.

¹² [Design Support Hub - Competition Policy - European Commission](#)

¹³ C(2025) 3602.

¹⁴ C(2025) 4319 final.

¹⁵ C(2025) 8493.

¹⁶ [Commission publishes Terms and Conditions for the first pilot auction for industrial heat decarbonisation with a budget of €1 billion - Climate Action](#)

¹⁷ See endnote 3 above.

¹⁸ [Selected strategic projects under CRMA](#)

¹⁹ COM(2025) 187 final.

²⁰ [Global Gateway Investment Package South Africa](#)

²¹ Regulation (EU) 2025/2083.

²² [Commission strengthens the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism](#)

²³ [Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative \(T-MED\) - Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf](#)

²⁴ COM(2025) 989 final or 2025/0419 (COD); COM(2025) 990 final or 2025/0418 (COD).






²⁵ C(2026) 42 final.













²⁶ COM(2025) 90 final.

²⁷ COM(2025) 944.

3. The Single Market Strategy (adopted on 21 May 2025)¹

The expected timelines of actions have been updated in view of most recent developments.

| Status | Chapter 1. Removing barriers: Doubling down on the ‘Terrible 10’ | Timeline |
|---|--|------------------|
|  | Simplification Omnibus VII on digital ² | 19 November 2025 |
|  | Simplification Omnibus VIII on environmental rules ³ | 10 December 2025 |
| | Competitiveness check as core part of impact assessment | Ongoing |
| | Review of national and European agencies in the field of the Single Market | Q3 2026 |
| | Public Procurement Act | Q2 2026 |
| | Revision of Directive on defence and sensitive security procurement | Q3 2026 |
| | First meeting of high-level Single Market Sherpas | Q1 2026 |
|  | First SMET annual high-level political meeting | 8 December 2025 |
| | Single Market Barriers Prevention Act (if necessary) | Q3 2027 |
| | 28 th Regime for Innovative Companies (EU Inc.) | Q1 2026 |
| | Revision of Commission Recommendation on business transfers | Q1 2026 |
| | Exploring EU legislation to address barriers to the mobility of workers | Ongoing |
| | Measures on professional qualifications as part of Skills Portability Initiative | Q3 2026 |
| | Explore EU legislation to establish common rules for the recognition and validation of qualifications and skills of third country nationals | Q3 2026 |
|  | Establishing common specifications when needed as part of the simplification Omnibus IV ⁴ | 21 May 2025 |
| | Update of rules on standardisation | Q3 2026 |
| | Revision of Textile Labelling Regulation | Q2 2026 |
| | Circular Economy Act | Q3 2026 |
| | European Product Act | Q3 2026 |
| | Facilitate provision of pan-EU services by providers authorised or certified in one MS on basis of EU law | Q4 2026 |
| | Legal guidance and recommendations to MS to provide clarity on the right to provide services cross-border on a temporary basis | Q4 2026 |
| | Support of co-legislators to conclude negotiations on the revision of Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 on social security coordination | Ongoing |
| | Support of co-legislators to conclude negotiations on the proposal for a public interface for the declaration of posting of workers | Ongoing |
| | Fair Labour Mobility Package | Q3 2026 |
| | Tools to act against unjustified Territorial Supply Constraints | Q4 2026 |
| Status | Chapter 2. Boosting European Services Markets | Timeline |
| | Construction Services Act | Q4 2026 |
|  | European Strategy for Housing Construction ⁵ | 16 December 2025 |
| | Initiative to facilitate the cross-border provision of industry-related services such as installation, maintenance, repair | Q4 2026 |

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------|
| | Guidance and recommendations to Member States to free regulated business services from unnecessary regulation | Q4 2026 |
| | Guidance to MS on the proportionality of their retail regulation | Q4 2026 |
| | EU Delivery Act | Q3 2026 |
|  | Digital Networks Act ⁶ | 21 January 2026 |
| | Initiative for single digital booking and ticketing for rail | Q2 2026 |
| | Initiative for paperless mobility for passengers and goods | Q4 2026 |
| | Initiative on cross-border car rentals | Q2 2026 |
| | Ensuring harmonised implementation and enforcement of the EU Services Directive | Ongoing |
| Status | Chapter 3. SMEs in the Single Market | Timeline |
|  | SME ID tool based on self-declaration available in all EU languages ⁷ | 21 May 2025 |
|  | Reinforcement of the Network of SME Envoys | Q4 2025 |
| | Publication of best practice examples of SME-friendly provisions | Q1 2026 |
|  | Definition of small mid-caps (SMCs) ⁸ | 21 May 2025 |
|  | Extension of certain SME benefits to SMCs as part of the simplification Omnibus IV ⁹ | 21 May 2025 |
|  | Extension of the existing SME fund, implemented by the EUIPO, for 2026 and possibly 2027 | 17 September 2025 |
|  | Commission Recommendation for a 'Voluntary SME' standard ¹⁰ | 30 July 2025 |
| | Development of voluntary streamlined approach to help SMEs demonstrate their sustainability efforts and improve their access to sustainable finance | Ongoing |
| Status | Chapter 4. Digitalising the Single Market | Timeline |
|  | European Business Wallet ¹¹ | 19 November 2025 |
| | EU Digital Identity Wallets roll-out | Q4 2026 |
| | Revision of IMI Regulation | Q4 2026 |
|  | Digitalisation of declarations of conformity as part of the simplification Omnibus IV ¹² | 21 May 2025 |
| | Revision of the EU acquis on e-Invoicing in public procurement | Q4 2026 |
| Status | Chapter 5. Enforcing respect of Single Market rules | Timeline |
|  | Strengthening of national SOLVIT centres and whole network | Q4 2025 |
|  | Systematic follow-up by the Commission and the Member States on structural issues identified by SOLVIT and on barriers, where SMET efforts have not been successful | As of Q2 2025 |
|  | First Annual Single Market enforcement agenda ¹³ | 29 January 2026 |



Proposal adopted / For legal proposals, indicates adoption by both the European Parliament and the Council



Legal proposal presented by the Commission and currently under adoption by the European Parliament and the Council

¹ COM(2025) 500 final

² COM(2025) 836, COM(2025) 837.

³ COM(2025) 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986 final.

⁴ COM(2025) 503 final, COM(2025) 504 final.

⁵ COM(2025) 991 final.

⁶ COM(2026) 16 final.

⁷ [SME Self-assessment | EU Funding & Tenders Portal](#)

⁸ C(2025) 3500 Commission recommendation of 21.5.2025 on the definition of small mid-cap enterprises

⁹ COM(2025) 501 final, COM(2025) 502 final.

¹⁰ C(2025) 4984 final.

¹¹ COM(2025) 838 final.

¹² COM(2025) 503 final, COM(2025) 504 final.

¹³ See Section 1, Box 2 of the main Report.

Annex 3


Overview of resilience measures by selected global players

1. Introduction

In 2025, a significant number of the EU's main trading partners announced policy measures and partnerships aimed at bolstering the resilience of supply chains. The accompanying international annex provides a non-exhaustive list of such measures, which only partially capture the full range of resilience efforts undertaken by partner countries throughout the year. The range and substance of the measures found reflect a global drive to improve supply chain resilience and economic security. The EU's trading partners have adopted these measures in response to recent global shifts in trade policies and economic strategies, particularly in the United States, and to the weaponisation of dependencies, for example export restrictions announced by China.

The critical raw materials sector is illustrative of the broader action taken to enhance supply chain resilience in 2025. Over the last 15 years, there has been an increase in restrictions within this sector³⁰, largely driven by export restrictions on rare earth elements and microchips imposed by China, coupled with geopolitical shifts in the US.

Figure 1: Number of exported raw materials subject to at least one export restriction measure



Note: The count of all types of measures in place across all covered raw materials and all implementing countries takes into account the stock of measures in place at the beginning of the period, as well as new additions and eliminations.


Source: OECD (2024^[3]), *OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials*.

Source: [OECD Report on Economic Security in a Changing World](#)

This trend extends beyond the critical raw materials sector. Recent years have seen a proliferation of policies aimed at strengthening supply chain resilience³¹. This emphasises the importance of deepening our understanding of policy developments in this area, and the urgent need for the EU to develop a foreign policy that aligns with its Single Market.

³⁰ [OECD Report on Economic Security in a Changing World](#).

³¹ IMF Working Paper on Industrial Policy since the Great Financial Crisis.

Figure 2: Number of trade policy measures and rationale, by year

Note: Cumulative stock of measures. For measures with multiple motives, each motive is given equal weight.

Source: [IMF Working Paper on Industrial Policy since the Great Financial Crisis](#)³²

The aim of this Annex is to give a non-exhaustive **picture³³[2] of the main policy measures and international partnerships** adopted by some of the EU's main international partners to reduce their strategic dependencies and to make their supply chains more resilient, especially in view of the digital and green transitions.

Gaining a better understanding of the methods used by these key international partners to strengthen their supply chains can help the EU to safeguard its critical supply chains and increase its open strategic autonomy. The information in this Annex also sheds light on measures that could potentially expose EU supply chains to risks by, for example, encouraging delocalisation and future disinvestment decisions.

In this 2025 edition, the inventory below lists the main resilience measures taken by some of the EU's main trading partners (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, China, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, India, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, Vietnam and Taiwan) that the Commission is aware of at the time of adopting this document, reflecting the level of information available for each partner. Therefore, **the actual number of resilience measures adopted by international partners could be far greater.**

After examining the collected data, the Commission has classified the measures taken by these trading partners into six specific categories with a more detailed description provided for the most recently adopted measures. In each category and for each international partner, the measures are listed and grouped thematically whenever possible – from broader, usually cross-sectoral measures to sector- or product-specific measures, for example:

1. industrial strategies, regulatory measures and crisis preparedness;
2. financial and fiscal support (including R&D);

³² 'GVC' stands for [global](#) value chains, and 'national sec' for national security as referenced in the [IMF Working Paper on Industrial Policy since the Great Financial Crisis](#).

³³ The data used in this inventory is publicly available and has been collected through the knowledge and intelligence of Commission departments and EU delegations, notably in media articles, press releases, official governmental documentation, and from contacts with the public authorities concerned.

3. public procurement and prioritisation mechanisms of domestic supply of goods and services;
4. trade toolbox (i.e. tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, foreign direct investment control, etc.);
5. international deals and partnerships.

These categories have been chosen as they mirror the policy instruments used internally and externally by the EU to make supply chains more resilient and diverse and to anticipate, prepare for and respond to disruptions. Their scope is deliberately granular to easily classify and regroup together non-EU country measures according to each policy's rationale and objectives.

The evidence collected in this non-exhaustive annex shows that the EU's main partners have announced **a significant number of new international partnerships and agreements**. They focus not only on trade and market access but also on specific sectors such as critical raw materials, clean energy and AI. In addition, several new trade measures have been introduced, including stricter foreign investment screenings, tariff quotas on strategic sectors, as well as the initiation of anti-dumping investigations. The adoption of these measures reflects the changing dynamics in geopolitics and international trade.

In parallel, **several trading partners have implemented policies to support their domestic industries, notably through public procurement**. These policy measures include public investments and prioritising supply in strategic sectors, such as energy-intensive industries like steel. In this context, international partners have adopted additional domestic measures such as financial support, fast-track regulatory permitting and improved crisis preparedness by stepping up the monitoring and stockpiling of critical minerals.

2. Overview of resilience measures by category and by countries

2.1 Industrial strategies, regulatory measures and crisis preparedness

United States

- In November 2025, the United States published an updated List of Critical Minerals. The new list includes 60 mineral commodities, of which 10 were new additions to the previous list. Some minerals were included based on the results of the economic effects assessment; others were included because of the potential for a single point of failure within the domestic supply chain and based on a qualitative evaluation.
- In October 2025, the US Department of Defence announced plans to acquire up to USD 1 billion worth of critical minerals, including cobalt, antimony and rare earth elements. The plan aims to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities and ensure the availability of essential materials for defence and advanced technologies.
- In October 2025, the US Department of Energy released its Fusion Science and Technology Roadmap, a national strategy to accelerate the domestic development and commercialisation of fusion energy. The roadmap focuses on i) building critical infrastructure to close fusion materials and technology gaps; ii) innovating through advanced research, high-performance computing and artificial intelligence; and iii)

growing the US fusion ecosystem through public-private partnerships, regional manufacturing hubs and workforce development.

- In August 2025, the US President signed an Executive Order on ‘Unleashing American Energy’ to review, rescind or revise regulations that unduly burden domestic energy and mineral production and expedite the permitting of energy and infrastructure production. The Executive Order also annuls previous Executive Orders related to climate policy, including state waivers and subsidies aimed at encouraging EV purchases. It states that the US should encourage energy exploration and production on federal lands, boosting US leadership in critical minerals and ensuring a reliable supply of energy.
- In August 2025, the US announced the creation of a stockpile of pharmaceutical drugs and a critical drugs list. Executive Order 14336 on Ensuring American Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Resilience by Filling the Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Reserve seeks to strengthen the resilience of the US pharmaceutical supply chain by stockpiling active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for essential medicines within the Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Reserve and promoting the domestic production and procurement of these APIs. Under the Order, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response within the Department of Health and Human Services is tasked with drawing up a list of approximately 26 critical drugs deemed essential to national health and security.
- In July 2025, the Department of Interior announced the launch of a programme to map mining waste deposits to recover critical minerals – including rare earth elements (REEs), germanium, tellurium, antimony, and zinc – from mine waste, coal refuse and abandoned uranium sites. The programme follows the US Department of the Interior’s Order No 3436 which seeks to accelerate the extraction of critical and strategic minerals from mine waste across the United States.

United Kingdom 

- In June 2025, the UK Department for Business and Trade published the UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy for 2025. The actions mentioned in the strategy include cutting electricity costs, reducing grid connection times, providing finance for innovative business, enhancing investor support to meet business demand for skills, simplifying regulation, boosting research and development (R&D) sending and deepening economic cooperation with partners. It focuses on eight key sectors: advanced manufacturing, clean energy industries, creative industries, defence, digital and technologies, financial services, life sciences, and professional and business services. It consists of a 10-year plan to make it quicker and easier to invest and expand in a more competitive, secure and resilient economy. Following the strategy’s launch, in August and September 2025, six sector plans were published for the advanced manufacturing sector, clean energy industries, creative industries, digital and technologies sector, life sciences sector, and professional and business services sector.
- In February 2025, the UK announced the Plan for Steel, including financial support for the sector. The aim of the Plan is to set out a clear and long-term vision for the steel industry. While the full details are still being developed, the government has committed up to GBP 2.5 billion in support through the National Wealth Fund and other channels.

Japan 🇯🇵

- In November 2025, Japan launched the Japan Growth Strategy Headquarters, a policy command centre which aims to revitalise the country's industrial base and economy with public-private investment. The Headquarters focuses on 17 strategic sectors, including AI, semiconductors, energy security and defence. It is composed of Japan's Prime Minister, government officials and 12 private-sector experts.
- In May 2025, the Economic Security Action Plan (launched in 2022) was revised adding five new critical areas to monitor in relation to national security and competitiveness. The new areas are fusion energy, manufacturing technologies for nuclear-related materials, satellites and rockets, undersea cables, and industrial-use data.
- In February 2025, the Japanese government decided to revise the legal guidelines of the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), which allows the government to temporarily take over critical factories of goods such as semiconductors during emergencies. The new rule could also come into play if a domestic company, influenced by foreign interests, were to attempt a takeover aimed at acquiring sensitive manufacturing technologies.

Republic of Korea 🇰🇷

- In February 2025, the Special Act on National Resource Security came into force. It aims to put in place early warning systems, manage the supply and demand for essential resources, and develop crisis response frameworks in order to tackle resource security challenges. More specifically, the Act outlines the creation of a Resource Security Council, chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy, to coordinate policy efforts; mandates the implementation of an early warning system to track and address resource security threats; requires designated organisations to stockpile key resources; authorises emergency actions such as price controls and resource allocation during crises; and requires the formulation of crisis response manuals alongside regular training exercises.

Singapore 🇸🇬

- In April 2025, the Singapore Economic Resilience Task force (SERT) was formed. The SERT is a government task force created to help Singaporean businesses and workers navigate current economic challenges, namely the uncertainties caused by the US tariffs, while developing a long-term strategy. In August 2025, the SERT launched an Economic Strategy Review (ESR). The ESR aims to develop longer-term strategies to strengthen Singapore's global competitiveness, leverage technology and innovation, nurture entrepreneurship, enhance human capital and manage the impact of restructuring. It involves five committees composed of members of government, private sector, unions and other stakeholders.

Australia 🇦🇺

- On 24 April 2025, Australia committed to create a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve to maximise the strategic value of Australia's critical minerals. The government allocated AUS 1.2 billion to establish the reserve in the 2025-26 Federal Budget. The reserve is expected to be operational in the second half of 2026. A task force was

established in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to advise the government on the design of the reserve. The task force reports jointly to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Resources and will consult with critical minerals industry associations and businesses, state and territory governments, international partners and other interested stakeholders.

India

- In October 2025, India announced the launch of the National Critical Mineral Stockpile to secure rare earth elements and other critical minerals essential for clean energy, electronics and defence. The government has allocated INR 500 (EUR 48.9 million) under the National Critical Minerals Mission to support this effort, and private-sector participation is encouraged in procurement, storage and release mechanisms. The stockpile will initially hold a two-month reserve of processed rare earths and will later expand to include other strategic minerals. The initiative is designed to act as a buffer against global supply disruptions and price volatility, particularly in response to China's export controls.

Canada

- In November 2025, Canada announced seven initiatives on energy and critical raw materials to be recommended for fast-track approval. The initiatives are worth a combined CAD 116 billion (EUR 71 billion). The announcement adds to the five projects already announced for fast-tracking in September and follows the launch of the Major Projects Office in August 2025. The aim of this Office is to have a single point of contact to get nation-building projects built faster.
- In June 2025, the One Canadian Economy Act received royal assent, which aims to remove interprovincial trade barriers and accelerate the approval of major 'nation-building' projects in an effort to bolster untapped domestic economic potential. The Act includes the Building Canada Act, which streamlines the regulatory process for projects in Canada's national interest, to be overseen by the Major Projects Office. The second part regards the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act, which facilitates the movement of goods, services and workers across provinces, in the absence of a Canadian internal market.

2.2 Financial and fiscal support (including R&D)

United States

- In July 2025, the US President signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025 ('OBBBA') into law, providing fiscal support to domestic research or experimental (R&E) expenditure and to support the domestic minerals supply chain. Under the OBBBA, full expensing of domestic R&E expenditures is restored, while the treatment of foreign R&E expenditures will continue to be capitalised and amortised over a 15-year period. In addition, the OBBBA introduces new federal spending measures that could support the domestic minerals supply chain, including USD 2 billion to expand the National Defence Stockpile through purchases of critical minerals, and USD 5 billion to the Industrial Base Fund to support critical minerals supply chains. It also includes USD 500 million to grow the Department of Defence Credit Program Account,

to provide loans, loan guarantees and technical assistance to critical mineral industries, and USD 1 billion under the Defence Production Act with financing up to September 2027. The final law is applicable to tax years beginning after 31 December 2024.

Canada

- In July 2025, Canada announced a new funding round to support clean energy products. The new round allocates CAD 40 million (EUR 25 million) of funding under its Low-Carbon Economy Fund's Indigenous Leadership Fund to support 13 indigenous-owned and -led clean energy projects. Projects receiving funding include solar panel installations, wind turbines, energy retrofits, electric vehicle infrastructure and heat pumps. The aim is to cut emissions, reduce energy costs and enhance energy self-sufficiency in indigenous communities. The fund is part of Canada's efforts to implement Article 29 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, and complements a previous announcement from early July 2025 of CAD 13.3 million (EUR 8.3 million) for five clean economy projects in Alberta and the Northwest Territories, including two indigenous-led initiatives.
- In July 2025, Canada announced financial support to the steel sector. The financial support consists of CAD 1 billion (EUR 609 million) as part of the Strategic Innovation Fund to help steel companies advance projects that will improve their competitiveness and start production of steel products not currently produced in Canada.
- In September 2025, Canada announced a Strategic Response Fund to help firms in all sectors impacted by tariffs to adapt, diversify and grow. The fund totals CAD 5 billion (EUR 3.05 billion) and will concentrate on strategic sectors disproportionately exposed to US tariffs and global trade risks, such as automotive, steel and aluminium. It will also have flexibility to intervene in other high-value sectors where federal action is deemed critical to maintaining investment and capacity in Canada.

United Kingdom

- In February 2025, the UK government pledged to provide GBP 2.5 billion (EUR 3 billion) of financial assistance to support the steel industry. The financial support followed the US announcement of a 25% tariff on steel and aluminium imports and will be provided through the National Wealth Fund.
- In 2025, the UK government announced a series of financial relief measures to support the domestic car industry in response to new 25% US tariffs on UK exports of electric vehicles (EV). These include i) a reduction of fines under the UK's EV mandate, that sets out the proportion of a manufacturer's sale that must be EV, from GBP 15 000 to GBP 12 000 per non-compliant vehicle; ii) more flexibility for carmakers to meet EV sales targets by allowing them to balance annual targets up to 2030, thereby deferring fines; and iii) a GBP 2.3 billion support package comprising tax breaks for EV buyers and investment in charging infrastructure.

India

- In September 2025, India approved an INR 1 500 (EUR 147 million) scheme to support the development of recycling of critical minerals. The initiative is conducted under the National Critical Mineral Mission and will cover e-waste, lithium-ion battery recycling and other scrap such as catalytic converters from end-of-life vehicles. The incentive

will be available for both expanding and modernising existing facilities and will run for six years. Both larger and smaller firms will be eligible, but one third of the total amount available is reserved for smaller firms.

- In May 2025, India introduced a Scheme to Promote Manufacturing of Electric Passenger Cars in India, in a move to boost domestic electric vehicle (EV) production and to attract global players to establish local value chains. Under the scheme, import duty reductions are available to global automakers that commit to manufacturing in the country. More specifically, up to 8 000 EVs per year can be imported at a reduced 15% duty if the automaker invests at least USD 500 million in local EV production facilities within three years.
- In September 2025, India adopted the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0 initiative, which expands financial support to capital equipment and materials in the semiconductor supply chain. Although not officially confirmed, the government was exploring an outlay of USD 20 billion of investment. The previous edition of the India Semiconductor Mission, launched in 2021, aimed to provide financial support for investments in semiconductor fabrication, display manufacturing and chip design. Under this edition, in May 2025, the Indian Union Cabinet provided USD 422 million (INR 3.706) of funding for the establishment of a new semiconductor manufacturing unit in Uttar Pradesh under the India Semiconductor Mission. The plant will specialise in producing display driver chips for mobile phones, laptops, automobiles and personal computers. The approval of the project brings the total number of such approved facilities to six under the India Semiconductor Mission.
- As of March 2025, the Indian government has disbursed EUR 2.1 billion under its Production Linked Incentive schemes. This scheme is designed to help develop local supply chains by inviting foreign companies to set up units in India and encouraging local companies to set up or expand existing manufacturing units and reduce the country's reliance on imports from other countries. It focuses on 12 key sectors including electronics, IT hardware, pharmaceuticals, bulk drugs, medical devices, automobiles, white goods, telecom, food processing, specialty steel, textiles and drones. The scheme has attracted a total of EUR 17.6 billion in investment, generated EUR 165 billion in production and sales, and created over 1.2 million direct and indirect jobs.

Taiwan

- In April 2025, Taiwan amended the Statute of Industrial Innovation, extending tax reduction incentives to companies in key supply chains. According to the Statute, companies with a critical position in the global supply chain (including those with technological innovations in semiconductors, electric vehicles and 5G) may claim an investment tax credit ('ITC') of 25% on R&D expenditure and 5% on procurement of machinery/equipment for advanced processes. Companies may apply to use such ITCs over seven years, from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2029 (the expiry date of the Statute). The most recent amendments extended the tax incentives for equipment investment, expanded the scope of eligible investment to include AI products and services, energy-saving and carbon-reduction initiatives, and increased the expenditure cap. The amendment also increased the tax incentives for investments in startups and safeguards to prevent critical technology outflows, requiring prior government approval

not only for overseas investments but also investments in designated countries, regions, industries or technologies.

Japan ●

- In October 2025, the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) announced plans to provide financial support for recycling hubs aimed at supplying automotive parts to manufacturers. The plan involves setting up 10 domestic hubs for the collection of recycled plastics. The MoE will supply JPY 974 million to run these hubs, namely to conduct research and support the installation of the facilities needed. The aim is to help private automotive manufacturers meet the mandatory requirements for the use of recycled plastics in vehicles the EU is expected to introduce.
- In September 2025, the Japanese Environment Ministry launched a subsidy scheme for companies and municipalities to promote the instalment of next-generation perovskite solar cells in buildings. The initiative consists of JPY 5 billion from the current year's budget to cover up to 75% of the costs needed to purchase and install these cells in warehouses, factories and gymnasiums where heavy traditional panels cannot be installed.
- In May 2025, the Japanese Cabinet approved a JPY 900 billion (EUR 5.5 billion) economic support package with total fiscal measures reaching JPY 2.8 trillion (EUR 17.2 billion) including local government spending. The package, brought in as a response to US tariffs, includes JPY 600 billion (EUR 3.7 billion) for energy subsidies, and JPY 300 billion (EUR 1.8 billion) to support SMEs through employment adjustment subsidies, government-backed loans (exploring lower interest rates), and new business consultation centres. JPY 388 billion (EUR 2.3 billion) from reserve funds will subsidise electricity and gas bills, cutting average household costs by JPY 1 000 (EUR 6) per month. The government also extended its gasoline subsidies, which were introduced in 2022, for the tenth time and took action to reduce rice prices.
- In 2025, Japan started updating the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), which is expected to expand support tools for economic security. The revised version is expected to include government funding for overseas expansion (such as port development and dock repairs), support to private-sector projects (such as submarine cable laying and maintenance), an expanded scope of critical infrastructure to medical facilities, the creation of a new think-tank, the setup of a Council for public-private dialogue, the protection of sensitive personal data and the addition of five critical products to the current list of 12 critical products. Specific companies supplying designated critical commodities will therefore continue to receive financial and fiscal support over the medium to long term. Subsidies under the ESPA aim to reduce the risk for private operators and encourage them to enter currently low margin/high-risk businesses and R&D.
- In February 2025, Japan published its GX 2040 vision, which indicate bonds totalling JPY 20 thousand billion for the green transformation (GX). The GX 2040 vision presents a detailed roadmap for medium- to long-term GX initiatives, enhancing investment predictability across public and private sectors. It focuses on specific sectors such as energy and other challenging industries like steel, chemical, paper and cement, alongside advancements in next-generation automobiles and airplanes. In addition to

providing financial investment, the vision indicates a gradual move to bring in carbon pricing.

Republic of Korea 🇰🇷

- In February 2025, the Republic of Korea launched a ‘key minerals investment council’. The council will identify private-centred key mineral investment projects and establish a comprehensive public-private support system that includes existing support programmes such as investments in the supply chain stabilisation fund, overseas resource development investigation, loans, overseas investment insurance and supply chain consulting support. The aim is to promote joint public-private investment in key minerals at an annual scale of KRW 50 billion. The council includes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with public organisations such as the Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corporation, local governments, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, the Korea Trade Insurance Corporation, the Korea Energy Agency, and the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), as well as private associations in the overseas resources industry.
- In February 2025, an amendment to the Restriction of Special Taxation Act was passed, raising tax credit rates and broadening the categories of companies eligible for incentives in strategic technology sectors. The amendment included a proposal to add AI and future transport sectors to the list of national strategic technologies and to raise the tax credit rate for investment in semiconductors by five percentage points. This measure builds on the Special Taxation Act (in effect since 1 January 2023) which sets out a precise list of 150 strategic technologies for which Republic of Korea-based manufacturing companies could receive tax credits, amounting to KRW 937.6 billion (EUR 631.1 million) in 2023. In April 2023, the Ministry of Industry announced that the list would be updated to include 50 extra technologies, bringing the list to 200 items.

Brazil 🇧🇷

- On 22 August 2025, Brazil announced the Sovereign Brazil plan. The plan has three pillars and includes strengthening the Brazilian production sector, which includes a BRL 30 billion (EUR 4.79 billion) credit line, extended tax payment deadlines and export incentives to the sectors most affected by US additional duties on Brazilian imports. This credit line will be available for working capital and investments to diversify and strengthen production chains.

2.3 Public procurement and prioritisation measures of domestic supply of goods and services

United States 🇺🇸

- In April 2025, the US President signed an Executive Order on Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance to strengthen US domestic maritime capabilities, streamline procurement and reduce regulatory burdens. Key actions include i) expanding the US-flagged commercial vessel fleet to ensure reliable domestic and international shipping capacity; ii) developing a strategy to ensure US leadership in Arctic maritime routes, countering growing foreign presence in the region; and iii) a mandated review by the

Secretary of Defence on the retention and mobilisation of the inactive reserve fleet, ensuring assured access to sealift capacity in times of military need.

- In March 2025, the US President signed an Executive Order to accelerate critical mineral production. The order requires relevant agencies to submit project reports within 10 days to the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council and to propose immediate approvals within 20 days where feasible. Agencies must also identify mineral deposits on federal lands, support leasing agreements with private landowners, and collaborate with companies on mineral development. The order also calls for a mineral production fund to be set up, and for other federal agencies to engage in financing and sales initiatives to advance mineral supply efforts.

Canada

- By November 2025, the Canadian government will bring in a new policy on Prioritising Canadian Materials in Federal Procurement, in the context of the Buy Canadian policy. The first tool introduced by the policy will require suppliers contracting with the federal government to source key materials from Canadian companies in defence and construction procurements exceeding a CAD 20 million threshold. Initially covering steel and softwood lumber, the policy may later be expanded to cover additional materials. The policy is also expected to stress reciprocity, with Canadian suppliers being prioritised along with suppliers from countries that grant Canada the same access through reciprocal trade agreements. The second tool relates to price preferences for Canadian suppliers or suppliers of Canadian goods. The scope is still to be defined but could be limited to certain critical sectors and apply a threshold mechanism.
- In July 2025, Canada announced the Interim Reciprocal Procurement policy, restricting access to Canadian government contracts to countries that have opened their procurement market to Canada. The initial phase will focus on applying the policy based on the location of suppliers, with a second phase determining supplier eligibility based on the origin of the goods and services offered.

India

- In April 2025, India revised its Domestically Manufactured Iron & Steel Products Policy 2025, prioritising domestic sourcing in public procurement. The policy mandates that all government ministries, departments, agencies and their funded projects give priority to domestically manufactured iron and steel products for procurements exceeding INR 500 000. It also prohibits Global Tender Enquiries for such procurements (including capital goods used in production) valued up to INR 2 billion, unless a waiver is granted by the Department of Expenditure. To enforce compliance, the policy brings in self-certification requirements for local content, procurement procedure standards, and an authorisation requirement for bidders representing domestic firms. In addition, a reciprocity clause bans suppliers from countries that exclude Indian firms from their government tenders.

China

- On 30 September 2025, the State Council issued a notice prioritising domestic production in government procurement activities. The notice specifies that domestic products must have a 20% price evaluation preference over non-domestic products in

government procurement activities. In addition, to be considered ‘domestic products’, the notice specifies that the cost of its components must reach the specified proportion, and key components and processes must meet the set requirements. It also sets out a five-year transition period during which for each product category the criteria for constituting a ‘domestic product’ will be further defined.

United Kingdom

- In February 2025, the UK’s updated public procurement rules came into effect. The updated rules envisage new economic security powers that make it possible to bar or exclude companies from procurement competitions on national security grounds.

South Africa

- In July 2025, South Africa announced the Public Procurement Bill, which mandates local production and content requirements in public procurement. Under Article 20, the Bill specifically mandates local production and content requirements in specific sectors. The responsibility for designating these sectors falls to the Minister responsible for trade, industry and competition, who is also charged with setting minimum thresholds and the duration of such designations. This legislation aims to establish a unified framework for procurement, promote the use of technology to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and enhance transparency and integrity to combat corruption.

2.4 Trade toolbox (tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, FDI control, etc.)

United States

- Since the beginning of his second term in January 2025, the US President has imposed several tariffs across many sectors and global partners, invoking both the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
- On 15 January 2025, the US Department of Commerce expanded export controls on advanced computing chips and certain AI model weights. The rule covers high-performance hardware and closed-weight AI models exceeding defined compute thresholds, it requires licences for export or transfer, and extends controls to foreign-produced items derived from US technology. It aims to protect US technological leadership, secure critical supply chains, and prevent the diversion of advanced AI and computing capabilities to adversaries.

Canada

- In July 2025, Canada announced further tariff rate quotas on steel imports. Tariff rate quotas were extended to countries that have a free trade agreement with Canada, with the exception of Mexico and the United States. FTA partners face a tariff quota equalling 100% of 2024 levels, after which a 50% tariff will be applied. Countries that do not have an FTA with Canada face a tariff rate quota equalling 50% of 2024 levels, after which a 50% tariff will be applied. In parallel, Canada introduced Melt and Pour tariffs of 25%, applied on imports from all countries other than the US containing steel melted and poured in China.

Australia 

- In August 2025, Australia announced a measure to streamline its anti-dumping processes. Australia transferred the responsibility for safeguard actions to the Anti-Dumping Commission. The reform is intended to make it easier for domestic companies to apply for measures against goods sold below their normal value (dumping) or sold with the aid of foreign subsidies, ensuring a more level playing field for Australian manufacturers facing a surge in imports, particularly in the steel sector.
- In March 2025, the reform of the Defence Trade Control Act 2012 came into force, applying new export restrictions to certain technologies. It includes a ‘deemed export’ offence for supplying sensitive technology to foreign persons within Australia, as well as supplying assistance such as training relating to these technologies.

India 

- In September 2025, the Directorate-General of Trade Remedies initiated anti-dumping investigations into solar encapsulants (excluding EVA encapsulants) imported from China, Republic of Korea, Vietnam and Thailand, prompted by a petition from RenewSys India.
- In June 2025, India imposed five-year anti-dumping duties on four chemicals – PEDDA (herbicides), Acetonitrile (pharma), Vitamin A Palmitate and Insoluble Sulphur - imported primarily from China, but also from Russia, Taiwan, the EU, Switzerland and Japan. Duties range from INR 481 per tonne to INR 20.87 per kilogram, depending on the product and origin. The move follows recommendations by the Directorate-General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) and aims to safeguard domestic producers from unfairly priced imports.
- In April 2025, India imposed a 12% provisional safeguard duty on certain flat steel imports for 200 days to counteract a surge in low-cost imports, primarily from China, Republic of Korea and Japan. The duty applies to specific steel products, including hot-rolled coils, sheets and plates, but exempts imports priced above certain thresholds to ensure access to high-end products that are not readily available domestically. The DGTR recommended this measure following an investigation that identified significant injury to domestic producers due to the sharp increase in imports.
- In April 2025, the Indian Ministry of Commerce issued an alert to customs authorities to maintain strict vigilance on imports and exports. The aim is to prevent trade from being diverted through India, which could lead to an artificial surge in imports and threaten domestic industry. Customs officials have been instructed to monitor for unusual spikes in trade flows, particularly from China and ASEAN countries, and ensure India is not misused as a transit hub. The alert was announced amid concerns over the re-routing and dumping of Chinese goods following the imposition of sweeping US tariffs on China.

China 

- In October 2025, China announced an expansion of its rare earth export controls, adding five new rare earth elements, expected to come into effect on 8 November 2025. In addition, the new export controls include extraterritorial provisions, requiring export

licences for products made outside China if they contain Chinese-origin materials or are produced using Chinese technologies.

- In April 2025, China imposed new export licensing requirements on seven medium-to-heavy rare earth elements (REEs) – samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium – along with their oxides, compounds, alloys and magnets. Under China’s Export Control Law (2020) all shipments of these listed REEs now require special export licences issued by the Ministry of Commerce. The move follows earlier export bans on gallium, germanium and antimony, and was introduced in direct response to US tariff escalations. However, the controls are widely viewed as part of a longer-term strategy to consolidate China’s dominance across global critical mineral supply chains.

Japan ●

- As at September 2025, Japan had launched four anti-dumping investigations on Chinese products. The investigations include investigating different types of steel such as cold-rolled stainless steel and galvanised steel.
- In May 2025, a draft industry guideline on preventing technology leakage was included in the revised Economic Security Action Plan. The draft guideline includes requirements for companies in critical industries to prevent cross-border technology leaks in order to receive government assistance.
- In April 2025, the Japanese government tightened the exemption scheme for prior notification of certain investments in sensitive sectors such as weapons, dual-use items, electricity, railways and telecommunications. The revised rules introduced two new types of investors for which the scope of FDI screening exemptions is smaller. The revised rules follow the review of Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.

2.5 International deals and partnerships

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS

United States 🇺🇸

- US-Saudi Arabia. In November 2025, the United States and Saudi Arabia finalised several agreements. These included a Critical Minerals Framework, which aims to deepen collaboration and strategies on critical mineral supply chains, a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation, which set a nuclear energy partnership between the two parties, and an AI Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which gives Saudi Arabia access to American systems while protecting US technology from foreign influence. Saudi Arabia also committed to make USD 1 trillion of investments in US infrastructure, technology and industry.
- US-Switzerland-Lichtenstein. In November 2025, the United States, Switzerland and Liechtenstein agreed on a Framework on the intention to negotiate an Agreement on Fair, Balanced, and Reciprocal Trade. Switzerland intends to encourage and facilitate at least USD 200 billion of investment into the United States over the next five years to

create manufacturing and R&D jobs. Liechtenstein intends to encourage and facilitate at least USD 300 million of investment into the United States and increase by 50% over the next five years the number of jobs created by its private sector in the United States. Switzerland and Liechtenstein intend to encourage and facilitate one third of these investments by the end of 2026. The US intends to lower tariffs to most-favoured nation tariffs or to the 15% rate, with some exceptions. The participants intend to begin negotiations on the agreement with a view to concluding it by the first quarter of 2026.

- US-Ecuador. In November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Ecuador agreed on a Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The agreement focuses primarily on non-tariff barriers and includes commitments to refrain from imposing digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health and safety standards. Ecuador also committed to reduce or eliminate tariffs in key sectors, including machinery, health products, ICT goods, chemicals, motor vehicles and certain agricultural products. The United States committed to remove its reciprocal tariffs on certain qualifying exports from Ecuador. The agreement aims to provide access to each other's markets and increase alignment on economic and national security matters.
- US-Argentina. In November 2025, the United States and Argentine Republic agreed on a framework to deepen bilateral trade and investment cooperation. The agreement focused primarily on non-tariff barriers and included a commitment to refrain from imposing digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health and safety standards. Argentina agreed to provide preferential market access for US goods exports, while the United States agreed to remove the reciprocal tariffs on certain unavailable natural resources and non-patented articles for use in pharmaceutical applications.
- US-El Salvador. In November 2025, the United States and the Republic of El Salvador agreed to a Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The agreement focused primarily on non-tariff barriers and included a commitment to refrain from imposing digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health and safety standards. El Salvador also committed to move forward with certain international intellectual property treaties, provide transparency and fairness regarding geographical indications, adopt and maintain high levels of environmental protection and to effectively enforce its environmental laws, among others. The United States committed to remove the reciprocal tariffs on certain qualifying exports from El Salvador that cannot be grown, mined or naturally produced in the United States in sufficient quantities, as well as certain products, such as textiles and apparel products.
- US-Guatemala. In November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Guatemala agreed to a Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The agreement focused primarily on non-tariff barriers and included a commitment to refrain from imposing digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health and safety standards. Guatemala also committed to provide transparency and fairness regarding geographical indications, protect internationally recognised labour rights, to adopt and maintain high levels of environmental protection and to effectively enforce its environmental laws, among others. The United States committed to remove the reciprocal tariffs on certain qualifying exports from Guatemala that cannot be grown,

mined or naturally produced in the United States in sufficient quantities, as well as certain products, such as textiles and apparel products.

- US-China. In October 2025, the United States and China reached a deal on economic and trade relations. The agreement covers notably Chinese commitments to suspend for a year current and past export controls restrictions on rare earths. In addition, China will take significant measures to end the flow of fentanyl to the US; will suspend all of the retaliatory tariffs that it had announced since March 2025; and will purchase at least 25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans in the coming years. China will also remove measures it took in retaliation for the US's announcement of a Section 301 investigation on shipbuilding and remove sanctions imposed on various shipping entities. The United States will notably lower the tariffs on Chinese imports by 10 percentage points and will maintain its suspension of heightened reciprocal tariffs on Chinese imports until 10 November 2026. The current 10% reciprocal tariff will remain in effect during this suspension period; the US will suspend for one year implementation of the interim final rule Expansion of End-User Controls to Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities; and the US will suspend for one year implementation of the restrictive measures taken in relation with shipbuilding.
- US-Thailand:
 - On 26 October 2025, the US reached a new trade framework with Thailand. Thailand will remove tariffs on 99% of goods and both sides will address non-tariff barriers. The US will keep a 19% reciprocal tariff while identifying the items eligible for 0% rates.
 - Also in October 2025, the US and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding to diversify global critical mineral supply chains and promote investments. Areas of cooperation include sharing information and expertise; coordinating on priority projects; engagement between governments, the private sector, universities; streamlining permitting and investment practices; transparency in competitive tendering; and protecting markets based on fair-trade and high standards.
- US-Malaysia:
 - On 26 October 2025, the US announced a new trade agreement with Malaysia, maintaining a 19% rate on goods, with some exemptions. The deal includes commitments to avoid restrictive import licensing, ensure fair market access for US agricultural products, and strengthen intellectual property protection. Malaysia also agreed to cooperate with the US on regulating sensitive technologies, aligning export controls, and sharing information on certain investments.
 - On 26 October 2025, the US and Malaysia agreed on a MoU to strengthen cooperation to develop and expand critical mineral supply chains; to promote trade and investment in critical mineral resource exploration, extraction, processing and refining, manufacturing, and recycling and recovery; and to support the transition to efficient and secure critical mineral and rare earths markets.
- US-Cambodia. On 26 October 2025, the US announced a new trade agreement with Cambodia, maintaining a 19% rate on goods, with some exemptions. The deal includes

commitments to avoid restrictive import licensing, ensure fair market access for US agricultural products and strengthen intellectual property protection. Cambodia also agreed to cooperate with the US on regulating sensitive technologies, aligning export controls and sharing information on certain investments.

- US-Vietnam. On 26 October 2025, the US announced a trade framework with Vietnam. Key terms of the framework include preferential market access for US exports, a 20% reciprocal tariff and collaboration on non-tariff barriers, digital trade, services and investment.
- US-Japan:
 - In October 2025, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan signed a Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing (US-JP Framework). This agreement commits the two nations to bolster their collaborative efforts in securing a steady supply of essential minerals and rare earths required for their domestic industries. This is achieved via financial support mechanisms, trade initiatives and strategic stockpiling systems for critical minerals. Within six months, both countries plan to implement measures that will provide financial backing to select projects aimed at producing end products for distribution to buyers in the US, Japan and other allied nations.
 - In October 2025, the US and Japan published a detailed plan for Japan to invest USD 550 billion in the United States. A total of 21 projects are listed in the fact sheet, spanning sectors such as critical energy infrastructure, AI and critical minerals.
- US-Australia. In October 2025, the United States and Australia signed a framework agreement for securing supply in the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earth. The framework covers closer cooperation with third parties and provisions on securing supply, investment in mining and processing, permitting, price mechanisms, asset sales, scrap, stockpiling and geological mapping as well as establishing rapid response groups. It aims to mobilise USD 8.5 billion to enhance the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare earths and to reduce dependence on China. Both nations committed to investing at least USD 1 billion each within six months to support projects in their respective countries.
- US-Republic of Korea. In July 2025, the US and the Republic of Korea announced the US-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment deal. In October 2025, the two parties reaffirmed their announcement, and in November 2025, a fact sheet was published detailing the terms of the deal. The Republic of Korea will invest USD 200 billion (USD 20 billion a year) across several sectors including semiconductors, energy, AI and critical raw materials, and will set aside another USD 150 billion to invest in shipbuilding. The reciprocal tariff rate will remain at 15%, as agreed upon at the tentative trade deal in July. The deal also includes provisions to prevent foreign exchange market instability, limiting required dollar funding to USD 20 billion annually, eliminating a cap on US vehicles, streamlining agricultural product approval and reducing digital service barriers.

- US-Indonesia. In July 2025, the US and Indonesia reached an agreement on a framework to negotiate an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade aimed at enhancing their bilateral economic ties. This agreement commits Indonesia to eliminate tariff barriers on over 99% of US exports, covering sectors like agriculture, health products, ICT, automotive and chemicals. It also addresses a broad slate of non-tariff barriers for US industrial, agricultural and digital exports, adopts more facilitative rules of origin and covers cooperation on economic security (including removing export limits on industrial commodities and critical minerals) and labour standards.
- US-UK. In May 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom announced a trade deal. While the 10% US reciprocal tariff remains in place for most products, the trade deal brings in selected tariff relief and market access improvements, particularly in agriculture, autos, metals and aerospace. Key measures include a new quota system for autos and steel/aluminium, reduced or eliminated tariffs on US exports like ethanol and beef, aerospace cooperation with Rolls Royce and Boeing, and plans for future agreements on economic security, pharmaceuticals and technology. The deal also introduces faster trade and customs processes.
- US-Ukraine. In May 2025, the United States and Ukraine signed an agreement on resource extraction and reconstruction, establishing a jointly managed investment fund to support mining, energy and infrastructure projects. The deal grants the US priority access to newly licensed critical natural resources, including rare earths, lithium, graphite, titanium and manganese, while ensuring Ukrainian ownership and excluding any actors linked to Russia's war effort. Both countries will contribute equally to the fund, with future US military aid counting as the American share. The deal excludes sovereign debt obligations, ports and nuclear assets, and includes provisions on technology transfer and innovation.
- US-India. In February 2025, the prime minister of India and the President of the United States have signed the Transforming Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology (TRUST) initiative. This initiative focuses on AI, semiconductors, defence, space and biotech. It aims to develop manufacturing capacity in India while ensuring resilient supply chains for the United States. It is designed to foster collaboration between governments, academia and the private sector with the aim of promoting the application of critical and emerging technologies in these sectors. Alongside this initiative, a US-India Roadmap on Accelerating AI Infrastructure was drawn up, targeting the creation of pathways for enabling industry partnerships and investments in next-generation data centres, as well as improving access to compute and processors for AI. The Joint Statement issued following the meeting between the prime minister of India and the President of the United States also announced the launch of the Strategic Mineral Recovery Initiative, a programme dedicated to the recovery and processing of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt and rare earths. The TRUST initiative was later expanded to include AI infrastructure and critical mineral recovery.

United Kingdom 

- UK-Japan:
 - In March 2025, the Department for Business and Trade and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and

Industry of Japan signed a MoU on offshore wind. The aim of the MoU is to support and encourage collaboration on offshore wind, in particular on exchanging policies and best practices, encouraging activities that help build sustainable supply chain capabilities for offshore wind projects, support bilateral investments and encourage collaboration between industries.

- In **March 2025**, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and the Fukushima Institute for Research, Education and Innovation signed a **Memorandum of Cooperation on joint research in robotics and autonomous systems**. The MoC aims to foster collaboration between the two government-funded organisations, mainly on advanced manufacturing, sharing best practices in research institutions, and initiatives to drive partnerships and support talent and skills development.

Australia

- Australia-Singapore. In October 2025, the two countries updated their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The CSP 2.0 encompasses closer cooperation in defence, supply chain resilience, green and digital economies, food security, renewable energy and innovation, as well as emerging areas such as artificial intelligence (AI) and space.

India

- India-Canada. In November 2025, India and Canada announced long-term partnerships in critical minerals, clean energy and aerospace cooperation. Both sides acknowledged the importance of expanding collaboration in these areas due to their importance for the energy transition and industrial growth. The details of what the partnerships will consist of in practice are yet to be made public.
- India-Israel. In September 2025, India and Israel signed a bilateral investment treaty valued at USD 800 million, aiming to increase investment between the two nations. The details of the treaty are yet to be made public.
- India-RoW. As at May 2025, India has signed Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) with the customs authorities of Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Australia and Russia. These MRAs aim to reduce inspection requirements and accelerate customs clearance.
- India-United Arab Emirates. In 2025, India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed eight memoranda of understanding (MoUs) across various strategic sectors. These agreements aim to strengthen collaboration in investment promotion, digital infrastructure, local currency trade, port connectivity, renewable energy and skills development. The MoUs are part of a broader effort to institutionalise economic integration and secure supply chain resilience between the two nations.
- India-Russia. In 2025, India and Russia agreed on six new strategic investment projects during the 8th India-Russia Working Group session in New Delhi. The projects aim to enhance bilateral investment and expand cooperation across key strategic sectors, as well as to reaffirm the commitment from both sides to deepen their long-standing ‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’.

Japan 🇯🇵

- Japan-India. At their summit meeting in August 2025, Japan and India announced the Japan-India Economic Security Initiative. The initiative encourages businesses to invest in and collaborate on projects across six key sectors: semiconductors, critical minerals, telecommunications, clean energy, pharmaceuticals and advanced technologies like AI. Both countries released a factsheet detailing ongoing partnership projects and highlighted the public funds available to provide financial backing and the forums created with businesses and experts to follow up on their commitments. The initiative aims to strengthen cooperation in economic security and includes support for the entire supply chain, from research and innovation to procurement.
- Japan-Brazil. In March 2025, Japan and Brazil signed a five-year action plan to strengthen their strategic partnership. The plan includes holding reciprocal leader visits once every two years and a new consultative framework for senior officials to discuss diplomatic and defence-related issues. The initiative aims to strengthen cooperation in areas like the economy, climate change and security.

Republic of Korea 🇰🇷

- Republic of Korea-India. In August 2025, India and the Republic of Korea resolved to expand their strategic partnership to cover new industrial sectors such as semiconductors, defence, clean energy and artificial intelligence.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

- Vietnam-Thailand. In May 2025, Thailand and Vietnam upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The two countries agreed to map out the ‘Three Connects’ plan in three main areas: supply chains, particularly in industries such as petrochemicals, food, electronics, logistics and semiconductors; local economies; and sustainable development, including green economy, renewable energy and the transition to a digital economy. The aim of the partnership is to promote the value chains between the two countries and advance growth. In July 2025, the two countries agreed to develop an action programme to implement the comprehensive partnership over the 2026-2030 period with concrete initiatives. It was also mentioned that a joint working group would be put in place to execute the ‘Three Connects’.

PLURILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS

- Japan-India-Africa. In February 2025, in the context of the Japan-India-Africa Business Forum, the Japan-India Cooperation Initiative for Sustainable Economic Development in Africa was launched. This initiative aims to promote Japanese investment in India as a business hub to facilitate Japanese private-sector investments in Africa, and to incorporate the Indian and African markets into Japan’s economic activities. It focuses on technological and human resource development, and includes developing the African critical mineral supply chain.
- United States-Japan-India-Australia. In July 2025, the United States, Japan, India and Australia formally launched the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative. The initiative aims

to build collective resilience and economic security by promoting i) joint efforts to secure and diversify global supply chains for lithium, nickel, graphite and other critical minerals; ii) closer cooperation on electronic waste recycling, critical mineral recovery, and reprocessing; iii) coordination with private-sector partners across Quad countries to facilitate greater investment in upstream and midstream segments; and iv) engagement with third (non-EU) countries, including in Africa. The initiative is part of broader effort to diversify and secure critical mineral supply chains essential for clean energy, defence and high-tech applications, particularly vis-à-vis China's dominant role and recent coercive action.

- India-Sri Lanka-United Arab Emirates. In April 2025, Sri Lanka, India and the UAE signed a tripartite agreement to develop an energy hub in Trincomalee. The agreement includes the construction of a multi-product pipeline and the development of a World War II-era oil tank farm, partially held by the Sri Lankan subsidiary of the Indian Oil Corporation.



Report 2024 -2025

Single Market Enforcement Taskforce

Contents

Introduction 3

1. Strengthening SMET through the Single Market Strategy 2025 4

- 1.1 SMET's organisation and the new political impetus 4
- 1.2 The SMET method and its evolution 5
- 1.3 Strategic Missions 5

2. SMET Facts 6

- 2.1 Territoriality (date) 7
- 2.2 Streamlining administrative requirements for cross-border service providers 7
- 2.3 Improving the authorisation process for placing biosolutions (biopharmaceuticals) 10
- 2.4 Facilitating the opening of bank accounts (financial services) 12

3. Strategic Missions 15

- 3.1 Strengthening SMET 15
- 3.2 Single Market 2025 16
- 3.3 Territoriality 16

4. Introduction 17

Annex 1: Overview of the SMET meetings 18

Introduction

“The Single Market creates prosperity and is the first driver of our competitiveness. It has increased EU GDP by at least 3-4% and created 3.6 million jobs, with large positive gains for all Member States. Further completing the Single Market would double the already achieved gains.”, Communication on the Single Market: our European home market in an uncertain world

In the current world marked by economic uncertainty, global trade tensions, and geopolitical instability, strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and resilience is more critical than ever. Prioritising strategies to enhance these aspects is crucial to safeguarding the Union’s economic prosperity and global leadership, ensuring that it is well-equipped to navigate both current and future challenges.

The Competitiveness Compass 2025¹, in line with the Letta² and the Draghi³ reports, lists a well-functioning Single Market as one of the five horizontal enablers for boosting EU competitiveness and promoting innovation by removing remaining barriers. It emphasises the importance of achieving continental scale in a world dominated by large powers.

With its 23 million companies and 450 million citizens, the Single Market serves as Europe’s proven engine for competitiveness and resilience. However, despite its critical importance, the Single Market today remains fragmented by various barriers, which undermine the EU’s economic potential and its ability to withstand external pressures.

Recognising this challenge, the European Commission published the Single Market Strategy 2025⁴ in May 2025, which presents a plan for a simple, fair and seamless Single Market. The Strategy places a strong emphasis on addressing concrete problems encountered by businesses and citizens. It adopts a barrier-centric approach, based on stakeholders’ reports. The same innovative method has been used by the Single Market Enforcement Taskforce (SMET). To complement the efforts launched with the Strategy, the President of the European Commission announced the forthcoming Single Market Roadmap to 2028 which will cover key areas such as capital, services, energy, telecoms, the 28th regime and the fifth freedom for knowledge and innovation.

1 [Competitiveness compass - European Commission](#)

2 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf>

3 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en

4 [The Single Market: our European home market in an uncertain world - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs](#)

1. Strengthening SMET through the Single Market Strategy 2025

The Single Market Strategy 2025 is a comprehensive plan outlining decisive actions to eliminate the most harmful barriers to the Single Market, starting with the “Terrible Ten”, to reduce red tape, and to help businesses, especially SMEs, operate across the EU and expanding their activities. It also calls on Member States to do their part in making the EU market the best choice for companies, workers and consumers.


The Strategy recognises the important role of SMET as a collaborative tool for the effective implementation of the Single Market rules and the removal of existing barriers. In addition to being an inspiration for the prioritisation of the “Terrible Ten” barriers, SMET also arises as an important mechanism for addressing them. The Strategy recognises the significant achievements of the SMET and proposes to further strengthen and expand its work. To achieve this, two concrete actions are suggested: annual high-level political meetings and systematic follow-up by the Commission.

1.1 SMET’s organisation and the new political impetus

Since its creation in 2020, SMET has continuously refined and enhanced its organisation and working methods, drawing on accumulated experience and adapting to emerging needs. Established as a cooperative platform, SMET facilitates collaboration between Member States and the European Commission to eliminate or limit specific barriers to the Single Market. Gradually, it has enhanced the involvement of various stakeholders and authorities at national and EU level in all stages of its work. Currently, they play an important role in identifying barriers, designing projects, and ensuring follow-up actions.

SMET operates on two levels:

- 1) a high-level SMET members forum sets priorities, monitors progress, discusses specific actions and takes decisions.
- 2) a ‘Sherpa level’ engages Member States and Commission experts to discuss barriers in greater detail, develop solutions and exchange experiences.



Dealing with broad, cross-sectoral issues, SMET relies on important political leadership and support from the Competitiveness Council and the European Parliament (IMCO). The Single Market Strategy 2025 proposed to further strengthen SMET's two-level structure by incorporating a stronger element of political steering and support. This political reinforcement aims to empower the Taskforce through an annual high-level political meeting, bringing together Ministers responsible for the Single Market and the Commission's Executive Vice-President in charge of the Single Market. The objective of this annual meeting would be to guide the future work plan of the SMET and to discuss a limited number of its projects that require higher-level political intervention to achieve the desired outcomes.

More information about the structure, functions and objectives of SMET can be found on the [SMET website](#) and in [the previous reports](#).

1.2 The SMET method and its evolution

To ensure that the Single Market delivers tangible results, SMET gathers input from stakeholders on the specific cross-border challenges they encounter and examines national practices in applying EU rules. Furthermore, SMET focuses on the most pressing barriers, identifying and promoting best practices and solutions to address unnecessary national requirements.

SMET does not replace but complements other enforcement mechanisms by offering additional solutions to remove obstacles to the smooth functioning of the Single Market. Work on SMET projects is voluntary and depends on the engagement and willingness of Member States to solve specific challenges. The European Commission, through the SMET secretariat, facilitates this work and provides technical and expert support for the overall functioning of the Taskforce and individual projects.

Despite SMET's overall success, recent feedback from stakeholders, coupled with modest outcomes from some projects, indicates that not all Single Market barriers are addressed as effectively as possible. To tackle this issue, the Single Market Strategy 2025 proposes that the Commission carefully analyse SMET's results. If barriers remain unresolved, the Strategy suggests concrete follow-up actions, such as infringement procedures for breaches of EU law, legislative revisions, or new legislation in cases where barriers stem from the absence or ambiguity of EU rules.




1.3 Strategic discussions

Alongside its regular work on sectoral projects, SMET undertook strategic discussions throughout 2025 in response to calls for strengthening and deepening the Single Market. The aim of these discussions was to gather Member States' perspectives on key policy challenges and explore future opportunities for improving the functioning of the Single Market. For more information about the recent strategic discussions within SMET, [please refer to Section 3 of this report](#).

2. SMET projects

One of the key SMET tools for addressing concrete barriers faced by citizens and businesses in the Single Market are the well-defined projects. Their success depends on clearly identified problems and practical solutions (preferably best practices in Member States) which can be implemented on the ground. Areas for potential projects are selected by SMET based on input from stakeholders and Member States, with priority given to the most pressing and widely reported barriers. Preliminary checks determine whether the barriers are suitable for SMET intervention (see annex 2).

To ensure project feasibility, SMET outlines concrete steps, solutions, and best practices to tackle the identified challenges. Projects are then submitted for approval, with the number of active projects governed by a “one in, one out” policy. Participation is voluntary, allowing Member States to opt out should they choose to do so. Relevant Commission departments and stakeholders are involved throughout all stages of the projects. During implementation, SMET and Sherpa members work in conjunction with competent national authorities to assess and apply the identified solutions. Member States commit to adopt some or all the practices and report on their progress. Completed projects are documented in SMET reports and published on its website⁵.



In 2025, SMET closed two projects on:

- Territorial supply constraints (section 2.1).
- Facilitating the opening of bank accounts for individuals workstream (section 2.4.1).

SMET continued to work on projects which started in previous years:

- Streamlining administrative requirements for cross-border service providers (section 2.2).
- Improving the authorisation process for placing new biosolutions on the market (section 2.3).
- Facilitating the opening of bank accounts for businesses workstream (section 2.4.2).

SMET has also done a significant initial work to follow up on Terrible Ten barriers as identified in the Single Market Strategy (see section 3.3).

2.1. Territorial supply constraints (closed)

Background

Territorial supply constraints (TSCs) are situations that condition the ability of wholesalers and retailers to buy products in one EU country and resell them in another. These practices potentially deprive consumers of better prices and choice in everyday products.

EU competition rules can stop these practices in some cases, but they don't cover all situations — especially when the companies engaging in these practices are not considered as having a dominant position in the market. A study commissioned by the European Commission in 2020 focused on the EU retail sector revealed that territorial supply constraints persist within the Single Market, especially when existing competition regulations may not be applicable.

Objectives

To carry out a fact-finding exercise and understand how widespread practices related to territorial supply constraints are across Member States and consider possible actions that would help businesses when sourcing in the Single Market.

Deliverables

- In 2024, SMET launched a project to collect further information on how different stakeholders experience TSCs and whether and how Member States had been dealing with them.
- The fact-finding exercise was carried out between September 2024 and June 2025 and confirmed the presence of TSCs in most of the Member States.
- The Directorate General for Competition from the European Commission was involved in the exercise from the beginning, providing valuable evidence from their investigations.
- Out of 25 Member States which replied to the questionnaire, 18 confirmed that retailers on their territory report the existence of TSCs.
- The most prevalent types of TSC practices are differentiation in packaging/labelling, refusal to supply, and unfair price differentiation for different markets.
- On 7 April 2025, the results of the fact-finding exercise were presented at the Stakeholder Dialogue. The event also provided stakeholders, including retailers, manufacturers, and consumers, with an opportunity to express their views. Retailers confirmed the existence of TSC practices. However, in some cases, these may be justified by national requirements or commercial reasons.
- Parallel discussions were held by the Council Working Party on the Internal Market and in the Working Party on Competition, further raising awareness of the problem.
- The work of SMET provided the Commission with a solid basis to work on a solution. It will serve as the foundation to develop tools to act against unjustified Territorial Supply constraints in Q 2026, as laid down in the Single Market Strategy 2025.

2.2. Streamlining administrative requirements for cross-border service providers

Background

The potential of the Single Market for services remains largely untapped, hindered by ineffective implementation of existing rules and the persistence of national barriers, particularly in cross-border service provision. Businesses providing services across Member States consistently report that, while willing to meet social policy objectives, they face administrative hurdles that complicate, and

occasionally prevent, the provision of these services. The complexity and burden of administrative requirements for cross-border service providers when posting their workers feature prominently on the list of barriers identified during consultations with stakeholders, workshops, and reports on the Single Market. These challenges are also among the “Terrible Ten” barriers highlighted in the Single Market Strategy.

At the same time, it is crucial when pursuing Single Market objectives to respect the high social standards embedded in EU legislation and advocated by the European Pillar of Social Rights. EU legislation permits Member States to impose certain administrative requirements to monitor compliance with posting of workers rules, provided these requirements are proportionate and justified. However, there is a wide range of practices among Member States regarding declaration processes and requirements for documentation and translation.

During the Competitiveness Council on 22 May 2025, ministers held an informal lunch discussion on removing administrative barriers for cross-border service providers, based on the current SMET project. A business providing high-tech services in most Member States presented insights into the barriers in practice, identifying main problems related to unclear notification rules, excessive documentation requirements, and impractical requirements like physical liaison presence. Ministers were invited to consider national-level actions to further implement the best practices and solutions, aiming to give new impetus to the SMET project.

To streamline administrative procedures for cross-border service provision, SMET initiated the current project in 2022. Over the past four years, the project has employed a variety of tools and techniques to enhance progress in this challenging endeavour.

Objectives

To reduce the administrative burden on businesses providing cross-border services, while safeguarding the protection of workers.

Deliverables

- SMET has identified eight best practices designed to mitigate administrative barriers faced by cross-border service providers. The implementation of these practices should not compromise the protection of workers’ rights.

Best practices used by some Member States and put forward in SMET

- **Targeted approach** – require a prior declaration only in the areas where there is a substantial risk for non-compliance with posting rules.
- **Short-term exemptions** – do not require a prior declaration when the cross-border service is provided for a short period.
- **Grace period** – allow service providers up until the end of the first day of work to make the prior declaration.
- **Number of documents** – require only key documents like employment contract, payslip, and timesheets.
- **Providing documents** – give service providers a reasonable time to submit documents if requested.
- **Translation requirements** – allow service providers to submit documents in any EU language.
- **Physical presence of contact person** – allow service providers to decide whether their contact person (responsible for liaising with labour authorities on substantive matters) will be in the host Member State or easily reachable from a distance.
- **Availability of contact person** – do not require a contact person to be available after posting.

- SMET members have been working with the responsible colleagues, enforcement authorities and different stakeholders, on how to implement the best practices.
- Progress on the best practices that have the highest potential to reduce administrative burden (Targeted approach or the Short-term exemption) has been limited. So far only 3 Member States have one or both of these practices in place and 10 Member States have expressed their readiness to consider them. Implementation of these practices would result in a substantial reduction of the administrative burden for service providers that need to make prior declarations. Furthermore, this would allow the authorities responsible for the inspections and controls to make best use of their limited capacities.
- Overall good progress has been made in implementing best practices related to number of documents and contact persons. As a result, service providers have to keep available fewer documents and have more freedom to appoint the contact person of their choice.
- To support the uptake of best practices and the use of a country-specific approach to implement them, the Commission held bilateral meetings with most of the Member States in 2003 and 2024. These bilateral meetings led to a better understanding and changes in the position of several Member States.
- In late 2024, Italy implemented the best practice giving service providers a reasonable timeline to submit documents if requested and removing the requirement to have a contact person physically present in the host Member State.
- In 2025, Malta implemented all best practices related to documents, including on the number of documents and when those documents need to be provided. Translation requirements have also been removed under a new notification process.
- Czechia also implemented the practice giving service providers a reasonable time to submit documents if requested.
- Estonia and Romania shared that they are preparing legislation to implement the Targeted approach and the Short-term exemption respectively. These are two of the most effective best practices from the businesses' perspective.
- The SMET project will be a basis for further discussions on how to address this important barrier.

Table 1: State of play of the selected best practices per Member State

| | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| 1. Targeted | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Green | Red | Yellow | Yellow | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | White | Yellow | Red | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | Yellow | Red | Yellow | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red |
| 2. Short-term | Red | Red | Red | Red | Red | Green | Red | Yellow | Yellow | Green | Yellow | Red | Red | White | Yellow | Red | Green | Red | Red | Red | Yellow | Red | Yellow | Yellow | Red | Red | Yellow | Red |
| 3. Grace | Red | Red | Red | Red | Green | Green | Red | Yellow | Yellow | Green | Green | Red | Red | White | Green | Red | Green | Yellow | Red | Red | Green | Yellow | Yellow | Red | Red | Yellow | Green | Red |
| 4. Documents | Red | Red | Green | Green | Green | Yellow | Green | Green | Red | Red | Green | Red | Red | White | Red | Red | Green | Yellow | Red | Green | Red | Green | Green | Red | Green | Red | Red | Green |
| 5. Provide | Red | Green | Red | Green | Green | Yellow | Green | Green | Yellow | Red | Green | Yellow | Red | White | Green | Green | Red | Yellow | Green | Green | Red | Red | Yellow | Green | Green | Yellow | Red | Red |
| 6. Translations | Green | Red | Red | Green | Yellow | Red | Green | Green | Green | Red | Green | Yellow | Green | White | Green | Red | Green | Red | Red | Green | Yellow | Green | Yellow | Red | Green | Green | Green | Red |
| 7. Presence | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Yellow | Yellow | Green | Yellow | Green | Green | Red | Red | White | Green | Green | Green | Yellow | Yellow | Green | Red | Red | Green | Yellow | Red | Green | Red | Red |
| 8. Availability | Green | Red | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Red | White | Green | Red | Red | Yellow | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Red | Green | Green | Green |

Suggested best practice will be further discussed
 Administrative requirements were already in line
 Suggested best practice will not be considered

Source: Member States input in SMET work

2.3. Improving the authorisation process for placing biosolutions (biopesticides) on the market

Background

Biopesticides are plant protection products based on biologicals, such as micro-organisms, instead of chemical substances⁶. After receiving approval at EU-level for the active substance/s, a biopesticide must obtain authorisation at national level before it can be placed on the market. These procedures often take a long time, sometimes more than 8 years. Furthermore, if the company wants to sell its plant protection product in another Member States, a mutual recognition procedure should take place. Complexity and length of the process for placing a biopesticide on the market often leads to innovative EU companies launching their new products in other markets (e.g. in the US), where a fast-track process for authorising biopesticides is applied.

There are several reasons for the lengthy authorisation process. The process and the authorities responsible for authorisation of biopesticides are often the same as for chemical pesticides. However, the expertise needed to assess such products is different. In many Member States, there is not enough experts qualified to assess biopesticides (such as microbiologists, biologists, ecologists, etc.).

Furthermore, sometimes companies cannot receive advice on how to prepare the full dossier before submitting it and the costs for preparing the biopesticide application dossier can be high. Compliance and processing costs related to approval are particularly harmful for start-ups and smaller companies, thus also constituting a barrier to innovation.

For the national authorisation of pesticides, the EU is divided into three zones: Northern, Central and Southern. Through mutual recognition, EU Member States can authorise pesticides assessed by another country (zonal Rapporteur Member State) in their zone. Currently, the possibilities offered by mutual recognition are not fully exploited by many Member States.

Objectives

To accelerate access to the market for biopesticides, helping innovative European companies to develop and grow in the EU and supporting more sustainable agricultural production.

Deliverables

- SMET members agreed to explore the possibility of implementing the following good practices and solutions:

- Introducing a **specific procedure** for authorising biopesticides.
- Establishing **dedicated teams** for the assessment of biopesticides, with the necessary qualification and specialised training.
- Offering **pre-submission advice** for applicant companies.
- **Mutual recognition** for biopesticides that have already been authorised in another Member State (from the same zone) within the 120 days set by the legislation.
- **Forecasting farmers' needs** for biopesticides based on the crops grown in the country.
- **Faster approval/mutual recognition** of biopesticides for agricultural needs.

6 Legal definition of the term biocontrol substance is under discussion at EU-level

- The updated reporting on the implementation of these practices can be seen in the table below.
- It shows that while some of the practices are broadly applied, for example participation in the training modules organised by the Commission and offering pre-submission advice, the uptake of others is much slower – introduction of dedicated team and procedure.
- Mutual recognition within the deadline set in the legislation also appears a challenge. Only 5 Member States report that they manage to mutually recognise biopesticides already approved in other Member States within the 120 days.
- The slow uptake of some practices showed the need to take further actions at EU level. As part of the Simplification Omnibus, the Commission proposed legislative amendments designed to accelerate the placement of biopesticides on the market. Some of the proposals were partially inspired by the collaborative work in SMET.
- As a next step, the project will be assessed in view of the recent simplification proposals, and the future directions will be discussed.

Table 2: State of play of the implementation of selected solutions/practices



Source: Member States input in SMET work

2.4. Facilitating the opening of bank accounts (the workstream for individuals closed)

Background

Access to bank accounts is essential for individuals and businesses to fully capitalise on the opportunities offered by the Single Market. The Payment Accounts Directive gives individuals in the EU the right to open a basic payment account and protects them from discrimination based on factors like nationality or place of residence. However, some difficulties still exist when consumers are trying to open a bank account, especially when they want to open an account across borders in another Member State.

Unlike consumers, businesses lack an EU-wide entitlement to a basic payment account, as the Payment Accounts Directive applies solely to individuals. This presents particular difficulties for SMEs seeking to operate or expand across borders. Having the ability to open a bank account in another EU country would streamline the process for businesses to manage transactions such as payments of tax and salaries.

Due to the differences in the challenges and the proposed solutions, the project was divided into two workstreams.

2.4.1. Facilitating the opening of bank accounts for individuals (closed)

Objectives

To make it easier for people from one Member States to open a bank account in another Member State.


Deliverables

- In 2024 SMET Members agreed to launch a project on facilitating the opening of bank accounts.
- For the workstream on individuals, SMET agreed to work on ensuring the availability of four best practices:

- **Authorities responsible** for handling rejections /complaints
- **Clear procedures** for the applicant to follow in if their request to open a basic bank account is rejected
- Non-discriminatory practices providing possibility also for cross-border consumers to open bank accounts **online**
- Non-discriminatory practices applied to **fees**

- The workstream was largely successful with a great majority of Member States having in place, at least partially, most of the suggested best practises. Currently around 90% of the practices are fully implemented or in the process of being introduced.
- As of June 2025, it was decided to close the workstream.
- The Commission continues to engage in bilateral discussions with Member States to verify the reported implementation status of the practices and further support their full uptake.

Table 3: State of play of the selected solutions/practices for opening bank accounts for individuals



Source: Member States input in SMET wiki ⁷.

2.4.1. Facilitating the opening of bank accounts for businesses (ongoing)

Objectives

To make it easier for businesses to open a bank account in another Member State.

Deliverables

- The workstream on facilitating the opening of bank accounts for businesses was launched simultaneously with the one for individuals in 2024.
- SMET agreed to work on introducing the five best practices, aiming to make it easier for European businesses or investors to open a bank account in a Member State different than their headquarter or residence.

- Cases where national law grants **businesses a right to a (basic) payment account**
- **Clear information** on the conditions for opening a bank account
- **Detailed justification** provided along with rejections
- **Simplified assessment of applications** made by companies/NGOs established in the EU
- Situations where national legislation established requirements **to prove the customer's connection** with the respective Member State.

⁷ State of play may be modified based on the bilateral discussions with Member States that are ongoing.

- In 2025, sherpas continued working internally with the relevant national authorities for the implementation of the best practices.
- The results show overall slow uptake of the practices. Since the beginning of 2025, only 9 Member States reported positive change ⁸.
- SMET members faced challenges in promoting the implementation of the best practices, including due to the lack of data at EU level and in most of the Member States.
- There is no clear agreement from most of the national authorities on the need to implement the selected practices, with some Member States preferring EU-level legislative actions.
- During its June meeting, SMET decided to continue working on the workstream, yet no concrete steps forward have been proposed.

Table 4: State of play of the selected solutions/practices for opening bank account for businesses



Source: Member States input in SMET work

- Exchanges with the responsible national authorities and the Commission on the possible way ahead are ongoing.

⁸ BG, CZ, EE, HR, IT, LT, NL, PT, SK

3. Strategic discussions

3.1. Strengthening SMET

Over the past year, SMET initiated several discussions to explore Member States' perspectives on enhancing SMET's results. The March 2025 meeting in Krakow featured strategic dialogue aimed at collecting and summarising concrete proposals for the strengthening of SMET. These proposals seek to build upon and strengthen the distinctive working methods that have contributed to SMET's success and have subsequently been integrated into the Single Market Strategy.

Engagement from stakeholders at both EU and national levels was highlighted as vital in addressing barriers faced by business communities. SMET's user-based approach prioritises tackling barriers from the perspective of those affected—citizens, workers, and businesses—making stakeholder involvement at all stages essential.

The collection of data and evidence at EU, national, and regional levels remains a challenge in shaping SMET's priorities and designing pertinent projects. Given the difficulties in securing objective data and the constraints of time and resources, ideas were sought for practical strategies to gather necessary information without excessive burden, prioritising the effective removal of real-world barriers.

Addressing areas where SMET projects have fallen short was also emphasised. SMET members expressed concern about the engagement levels of some Member States in tackling critical barriers. It is crucial for responsible services and authorities to analyse proposals and take appropriate action to eliminate persistent barriers, with Commission follow-up deemed essential. Finally, improving visibility and securing political support for SMET's findings within the Competitiveness Council was recognised as essential.

3.2. The Single Market Strategy 2025

SMET members broadly welcomed the Single Market Strategy 2025, viewing it as a long-awaited shift towards a more solution-focused and politically grounded approach to addressing barriers within the Single Market. The Strategy's emphasis on tackling concrete problems was strongly endorsed, along with the role of SMET in implementing this ambitious agenda. However, it was widely acknowledged that SMET must be strengthened to ensure tangible change is driven on the ground.

There was broad agreement on the necessity for strong political backing to effectively eliminate barriers to cross-border activities. To tackle this challenge, the Single Market Strategy proposed High-level political SMET meetings and the introduction of Single Market Sherpas. It was acknowledged that further efforts are necessary in addressing unsuccessful SMET projects, and the way proposed by the Strategy was considered to be a relevant solution. SMET members emphasized the need for structured and transparent monitoring of SMET projects, including a thorough analysis of less successful cases. They advocated for effective follow-up on unresolved barriers, including through discussions at the Competitiveness Council and the application of enforcement tools, where appropriate. A practical approach that avoids bureaucracy was prioritised.


3.3. Terrible Ten

SMET has significantly engaged in discussions about the most pressing Single Market barriers for businesses. The outcomes of these discussions informed the Single Market Strategy and laid the groundwork for what is known as the “Terrible Ten” barriers. The rationale was to prioritise obstacles by focusing first on those frequently highlighted by companies and workers as impediments to their cross-border activities.

The “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Strategy were welcomed by SMET as a positive, practical step that supports its well-founded approach. To address them effectively, each “Terrible Ten” barrier was broken down into specific problems experienced by companies on the ground. A priority list of such problems was established, and consulted with stakeholders and SMET to ensure that, while not exhaustive, it captures the most significant issues to address initially.

To initiate a more detailed debate among Member States on future steps, the European Commission prepared an initial overview of the performance of each country on the specific issues. The overview is based on various available indicators and preliminary stakeholder’s input. Bilateral meetings with most of the SMET members were held to start discussions early on and clarify the methodology and the way forward. Further work on specific solutions and on how to deliver progress will take place in dedicated policy forums such as working and expert groups with a support of SMET. SMET will launch the discussions on individual issues and ensure overall progress. Therefore, SMET will also seek political support in instances where technical-level progress would be insufficient.

Addressing the “Terrible Ten” process



At the Competitiveness Council meeting on 8 December 2025, ministers exchanged views on the removal of internal market barriers, focusing on the “Terrible Ten”. This part of the discussion was also branded as a high-level political SMET meeting, fulfilling the commitment under the Single Market Strategy. The debate stressed the need for urgent and decisive actions to remove barriers to the Single Market while avoiding creating new ones. Member States highlighted the importance of SMET and confirmed the Competitiveness Council as the right venue for further discussions, while emphasising the need to involve other relevant Council formations, as well as the need for prioritisation, implementation and reporting.

4. Future direction

SMET role in pursuing action to remove barriers in the Single market continues to be critical. The innovative SMET approach to tackling Single Market barriers already inspired several policy initiatives. SMET will continue driving practical solutions to specific problems faced by businesses and citizens. The involvement of stakeholders, both at national and EU level, is critical and will be expanded further to ensure that SMET remains on the right path.

Furthermore, SMET will play a crucial role in addressing the “Terrible Ten” barriers. It will establish the groundwork for actions related to identified issues, beginning with a kick-off meetings. During these meetings, stakeholders will outline the challenges they face, while the SMET will work closely with the responsible Commission services and national experts to address the identified problems. SMET will support progress on each problem and prepare political discussions to seek political level engagement in addressing potential impasses and to steer the process.

The role of SMET will be twofold – to ensure that the correct actions for addressing the specific problems are implemented both at EU and national level and to complement some of these actions with concrete project.

SMET will also continue its work on identifying and removing other pressing barriers to the Single Market, beyond the scope of the “Terrible Ten.” Efforts on ongoing projects will continue. The flagship initiative on facilitating the cross-border provision of services will be reinforced as the barrier is now one of the “Terrible Ten”.

Strong political support for improving the Single Market highlights the need for intensified efforts to bolster its functioning and can serve as impetus to strengthen SMET’s role in the coming years. Focused discussions in the Competitiveness Council, prepared by SMET, could play a significant role in raising political awareness of Single Market barriers and promoting the swift implementation of practical solutions.

Annex 1: Overview of the SMET meetings

